UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4210
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DORIAN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-4219
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DORIAN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-4220
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DORIAN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, T.S.
Ellis, III, District Judges. (CR-94-460; CR-94-381; CR-95-57)
Submitted: June 30, 2005 Decided: July 29, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denise J. Tassi, LAW OFFICES OF DENISE J. TASSI, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney,
Mark C. Grundvig, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Dorian Jones appeals the orders revoking his concurrent
terms of supervised release and imposing concurrent twenty-four-
month terms of imprisonment. We affirm.
In February 2004, Jones began serving terms of supervised
release on four convictions imposed by two different judges in
three cases in the Eastern District of Virginia. The conditions of
supervised release in each sentence included the statutory
prohibitions against committing a crime while on supervised
release, possessing a firearm, and unlawfully possessing controlled
substances, and the standard requirements that Jones follow his
probation officer’s instructions and inform the probation officer
within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by police.
In January 2005, Jones’ probation officer filed with each
judge identical petitions to revoke supervised release, alleging
that Jones had violated several conditions of supervised release.
One of the judges conducted a supervised release revocation
hearing. The judge found that Jones committed all the supervised
release violations cited in the petition, revoked supervised
release in the two cases pending before that court, and imposed
concurrent twenty-four month prison terms. The other judge adopted
the findings of the first judge, revoked supervised release in the
case pending before him, and imposed a twenty-four month prison
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term to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in the other
proceedings. Jones timely appealed in all three cases.
Jones first argues that he was denied due process because
the district court conducting the supervised release hearing did
not provide reasons for concluding that he violated the conditions
of supervised release. A defendant is entitled to a written
statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied upon and the
grounds for revoking supervised release. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (1972). This requirement of a “written statement”
may be satisfied by a transcript of an oral finding “when the
transcript and record compiled before the trial judge enable the
reviewing court to determine the basis of the trial court’s
decision. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.
1992). In the cases before us, the court’s recitation of the
evidence relied upon to find violations may not be a “model for
satisfaction of this due process rule,” id. at 832, but it is
sufficient.
Jones also contends that his Fifth Amendment right to due
process and his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses were
violated when hearsay evidence was admitted at the proceeding.
Supervised release revocation hearings are informal proceedings in
which the rules of evidence need not be strictly observed. Cf.
Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (excluding probation revocation hearings
from proceedings governed by federal rules of evidence). Thus, the
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hearsay nature of evidence does not render its admission improper.
Instead, the inquiry focuses on whether the evidence was
sufficiently reliable. Cf. United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d
1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982) (allowing admission of hearsay during
probation revocation hearing as long as it is reliable). Our
review of the hearsay in the context in which it was presented in
these cases demonstrates that it was well corroborated and we
conclude that it was sufficiently reliable.
Jones argues that the district court failed to require,
and the government failed to show, good cause why it was necessary
to rely on hearsay evidence. However, Jones never objected to the
hearsay evidence or asserted his right at the hearing to question
the witnesses he now asserts he had a right to examine. Cf. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (2002 advisory committee’s notes)
(stating that where defendant at supervisory release revocation
asserts right to cross-examine witness, the court should “balance
the person’s interest in the constitutionally guaranteed right to
confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it”).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court orders
revoking supervised release and sentencing Jones to concurrent
twenty-four month terms of imprisonment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
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