UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4979
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
NADIM ABDULLAH MATIN, a/k/a Anthony German,
a/k/a Anthony Gerard German,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.
(CR-03-569-BEL)
Submitted: June 22, 2005 Decided: August 12, 2005
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marcia G. Shein, LAW OFFICES OF MARCIA G. SHEIN, P.C., Decatur,
Georgia, for Appellant. Allen F. Loucks, United States Attorney,
Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Nadim Abdullah Matin appeals the district court’s
judgment imposing a 210-month sentence after a jury found him
guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute a mixture containing cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 846 (2000); possession with intent
to distribute a mixture containing cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000);
possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing cocaine
hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C) (2000)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); and possession with intent to distribute
a mixture containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). We affirm.
Matin first claims that the district court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that the
Government violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. Under
the Speedy Trial Act, an indictment must be filed within thirty
days from the date on which a defendant is arrested, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(b) (2000), and the trial must commence within seventy days
of the filing date of the indictment or the date of a defendant’s
initial appearance, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2004). Certain delays are excludable when
computing the time within which a defendant must be indicted or his
trial must commence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9) (2000). We find
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no error in the district court’s conclusion that Matin’s rights
under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated.
Matin next contends that the district court erred when it
denied him the opportunity to cross-examine a Drug Enforcement
Agency agent’s veracity, where another trial court questioned the
truthfulness of law enforcement agents during a suppression hearing
at which the DEA agent testified. Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence allows for the admission, in the discretion of the
trial judge, of probative evidence of a “witness’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Nevertheless, Rule 608(b)
prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence of “[s]pecific instances of
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness’ credibility,” unless the evidence is
“probative of a material issue in a case.” United States v. Smith
Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 531 (4th Cir. 1985). Based
on these principles, we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it limited the cross-examination of the
Government witness based on Rule 608(b).
Matin further argues that the district court erred when
it denied his motion for a continuance based upon his request to
investigate suspected misconduct by the same law enforcement agent.
A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a continuance
based upon an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence on
expeditiousness. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). A
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defendant must show that the denial prejudiced his case. Hill v.
Ozmint, 339 F.3d 187, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2003). We find that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Matin’s
request for a continuance because the court conducted a
comprehensive review of this issue.
Matin also appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress because, he contends, there was no probable
cause to arrest him without a warrant. This court reviews the
factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error,
and the district court’s legal determinations de novo. See Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). When a suppression
motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. See United States v.
Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). Reviewing the record
in the light most favorable to the Government, we find that the
district court did not err when it denied Matin’s motion to
suppress the fruits of the search following his arrest and his own
admissions made subsequent to that arrest. See United States v.
Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995) (ruling that police
surveillance will support a finding of probable cause where
officers observe conduct that is consistent with a drug
transaction).
Finally, citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004), Matin contends only that his Sixth Amendment right to a
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jury trial was violated because the district court impermissibly
enhanced his sentence based on drug type and drug quantity.
Matin’s sentence was calculated, pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c)(3)(2003), based upon
findings that he possessed more than 150 grams of cocaine base. In
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court
held that the mandatory manner in which the federal sentencing
guidelines required courts to impose sentencing enhancements based
on facts found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence
violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 746, 750 (Stevens, J.,
opinion of the Court). The Court reaffirmed its holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that “[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker,
125 S. Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). Our review
of the record in this case convinces us that no Sixth Amendment
violation occurred because Matin’s sentence was based on the jury’s
express findings as to the drug types and quantities.
Accordingly, we affirm Matin’s conviction and his
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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