UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2162
OLIVER OKONDA SHUNGU, a/k/a Oliver Okonda
Shongo, a/k/a Likusa Yowa,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A78-151-923)
Submitted: May 31, 2005 Decided: August 8, 2005
Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David H. Remes, Gregory M. Lipper, COVINGTON & BURLING, Washington,
D.C., for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General, James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation Counsel, Margaret A.
O’Donnell, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Oliver Okonda Shungu, a native and citizen of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, petitions for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the immigration
judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Shungu contends that
the Board did not give adequate weight to some portions of his
evidence and engaged in speculation in finding that Shungu and his
prime witness were not credible.
We will reverse the Board only if the evidence “was so
compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
483-84 (1992)). Credibility determinations of the immigration
judge and the Board are entitled to deference as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. See Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d
76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989). We have reviewed the evidence of record,
the immigration judge’s decision, and the Board’s order, and we
conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the immigration judge’s finding that the testimony was not
credible. We further find that substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that Shungu failed to establish the past persecution or
well-founded fear of future persecution necessary to establish
eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2005) (stating
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that the burden of proof is on the alien to establish eligibility
for asylum); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 (same).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of
withholding of removal as well. “Because the burden of proof for
withholding of removal is higher than for asylum--even though the
facts that must be proved are the same--an applicant who is
ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of
removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). As Shungu is not eligible for
asylum, he fails to qualify for withholding of removal.
Protection under the CAT is generally granted in the form
of withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2005). An
applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Again, we find that the Board’s finding
is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we deny Shungu’s petition for review. We
deny Shungu’s “Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal Pending
Resolution of Appeal” as moot. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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