UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4185
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY CHATANE WHITE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (CR-04-632)
Submitted: August 15, 2005 Decided: August 25, 2005
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Scott Gasser, Acting
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Elizabeth Jean
Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Chatane White appeals his conviction and
235-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). White’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging
White’s sentence but stating that, in his view, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. White has filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
In his pro se supplemental brief, White asserts that the
district court violated several provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11,
in accepting his guilty plea. White contends that the court failed
to explain the elements of the offense, see Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(G), failed to inform him of the correct minimum and
maximum penalties he faced, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I),
and accepted an insufficient factual basis as support for his plea,
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Because White did not move in the
district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we review his challenge
to the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review
of the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing leads us to conclude that
the district court fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11.
We therefore find no plain error in the court’s acceptance of
White’s guilty plea.
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Next, White’s counsel questions whether the district
court properly classified White as a career offender pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2003). Because White
did not object in the district court, this court’s review is for
plain error. United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir.
2005) (stating standard of review). We conclude that the district
court properly designated White as a career offender. See id.
(discussing elements of USSG § 4B1.1(a)).
Finally, counsel raises as a potential issue the
reasonableness of White’s 235-month sentence in light of United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme
Court held that the mandatory manner in which the federal
Sentencing Guidelines required courts to impose sentencing
enhancements based on facts found by the court by a preponderance
of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. 125 S. Ct. at 746,
750 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court remedied the
constitutional violation by making the Guidelines advisory through
the removal of two statutory provisions that had rendered them
mandatory. Id. at 746 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court); id. at
756-67 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
Although the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer
mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court “must consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125
S. Ct. at 767 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). The court should
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consider this sentencing range along with the other factors
described in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and
then impose a sentence. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
546 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying Booker on plain error review). The
sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . .
reasonable.” Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted).
White’s classification as a career offender does not
violate the Sixth Amendment. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756
(Stevens, J., opinion of the Court) (“Any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or
a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Collins, 412
F.3d 515, 523 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that application of career
offender enhancement did not violate Booker where facts were
undisputed, thereby making it unnecessary to engage in further fact
finding about a prior conviction). Moreover, in sentencing White,
the district court considered the Guidelines as advisory only and
considered all of the factors in § 3553(a). Because the district
court sentenced White within a properly calculated Guideline range
and well within the forty-year statutory maximum, see 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005), we conclude that the
sentence is reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm White’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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