UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4816
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DWAIN THOMAS REECE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-132)
Submitted: August 17, 2005 Decided: September 13, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Robert M.
Hamilton, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Dwain Thomas Reece appeals the fifty-four month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to armed bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2000). Reece does not challenge his
conviction on appeal. Reece’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were
no meritorious issues for appeal, yet objecting to his criminal
history category under the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Reece, by counsel, also filed a
supplemental brief in which he argued that, in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
the district court erred by sentencing him under the mandatory
guidelines. Because our review of the record discloses no
reversible error, we affirm Reece’s sentence.
Reece first contends that, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the
district court erroneously calculated his criminal history score,
as the court had to make factual findings beyond the mere fact of
conviction. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000),
the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Booker, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756
- 2 -
(Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). While we have recognized that
not all prior convictions fall within the Apprendi exception
framework, see United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 842-43
(4th Cir. 2005), because they may require attendant, impermissible
fact-finding by the district court, such concerns are inapplicable
in this case because none of the facts underlying the district
court’s assessment of Reece’s criminal history points were
disputed. We therefore find that the district court’s assessment
of criminal history points did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Reece also maintains that even if the district court did
not err in calculating his criminal history category, it erred in
failing to treat the guidelines as advisory. Because this issue
was not raised before the district court, we review for plain
error.1 Under this standard, although Reece is correct that the
district court committed error in treating the guidelines as
mandatory,2 see Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547-48, he is not entitled to
relief. We recently held that in a plain error context, the error
of sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime did not warrant
a presumption of prejudice nor was it a structural error. United
1
Reece maintains that this issue was properly preserved based
on his Blakely objection that was raised before the district court.
We find, however, that Reece’s objection was narrowly tailored to
the calculation of his criminal history category.
2
Although Booker establishes that the district court erred by
treating the guidelines as mandatory, we note that the court
followed the law in effect at the time of Reece’s sentencing.
- 3 -
States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 224 (4th Cir. 2005). As nothing in
the record suggests the error affected the court’s ultimate
determination of Reece’s sentence, Reece cannot satisfy the
prejudice requirement of the plain error standard.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Reece’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -