UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4836
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRIAN LEE CORBETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
District Judge. (CR-03-187)
Submitted: September 21, 2005 Decided: September 30, 2005
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tim C. Carrico, CARRICO LAW OFFICES, LC, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, Acting United States Attorney,
John L. File, Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Brian Lee Corbett appeals his 46-month sentence, imposed
pursuant to his guilty plea to various drug and firearm offenses.
On appeal, he challenges the drug quantity attributed to him and
the use of his prior convictions to enhance his base offense level
and calculate his criminal history category under Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). He also asserts that his term of
supervised release violated Blakely. Finding no error, we affirm.
In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005),
the Supreme Court held that Blakely applied to the federal
sentencing guidelines and that the mandatory manner in which the
guidelines required courts to impose sentencing enhancements based
on facts found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence
violated the Sixth Amendment. Thus, when a defendant pleads guilty
and is sentenced under the mandatory guidelines scheme, “[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by [the] plea of guilty . . . must be admitted by the defendant.”
Id. at 756. Because Corbett objected below, we review de novo.
See United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2003).
With regard to the drug quantity, Corbett was sentenced
for three ounces of cocaine powder, which he alleges was not
authorized by either the charging instrument or his admissions at
the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. However, the record belies
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Corbett’s contentions. Corbett clearly admitted to involvement
with more than three ounces of cocaine powder. The three ounces
for which he was held responsible were involved in two transactions
which Corbett described in detail at his Rule 11 hearing. Because
Corbett was properly sentenced based on his admissions, there is no
Booker error.
Turning to Corbett’s prior convictions, Corbett
challenges their use in calculating his criminal history and
setting his base offense level, since he did not make any
admissions in this regard. In Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1254 (2005), the Supreme Court instructed that Sixth Amendment
protections apply to disputed facts about a prior conviction that
are not evident from “the conclusive significance of a prior
judicial record.” Id. at 1262-63. Here, Corbett did not contest
any facts about his prior convictions; rather, his is a purely
legal argument. Therefore, the district court did not consider any
facts he had not admitted, and the court’s determination of his
base offense level and criminal history category did not violate
the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515,
522-23 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where
nature and separateness of predicate offenses for career offender
status were undisputed).
Finally, Corbett asserts that Blakely invalidated the
Sentencing Reform Act, and hence, the district court lacked the
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authority to impose a term of supervised release. However, Booker
makes clear that Blakely did not invalidate the Sentencing Reform
Act in its entirety; instead, the Supreme Court excised two
provisions related to the mandatory nature of the guidelines and
left the rest of the Act intact. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57.
Specifically, the Court did not invalidate 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583 (West
2000 & Supp. 2005), the provision which authorizes imposition of a
term of supervised release. Moreover, a three-year term of
supervised release is required under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C)
(West Supp. 2005). Therefore, the district court did not err in
imposing a term of supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm Corbett’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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