UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5118
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BASSEM MAHMOUD HUSSEIN, a/k/a Bassem Mahmoud
El Tayeb,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-46)
Submitted: September 14, 2005 Decided: October 13, 2005
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, David T. Maguire, S. David Schiller, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Bassem Mahmoud Hussein, an immigrant from Egypt, appeals
his jury trial conviction for conspiracy to obtain false
identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(f)
(2000), and three counts of causing the Department of Motor
Vehicles (“DMV”) to produce false identification documents, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(A), 2
(2000). We affirm.
Hussein first contends that the district court erred by
denying his third motion for a continuance. The denial of a motion
for a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it denies a continuance based upon an unreasonable
and arbitrary insistence on expeditiousness. Id. “[O]nly an
unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the
face of a justifiable request for a delay’ violates the right to
assistance of counsel.” Id. (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S.
575, 589 (1964)). Moreover, a defendant must show that the denial
prejudiced his case. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1434
(4th Cir. 1985). Although Hussein’s original public defender was
not able to render services through the conclusion of the trial,
the record reflects that replacement counsel entered her appearance
three weeks before trial. In that three weeks counsel had an
opportunity to meet with Hussein several times and file proposed
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jury instructions and voir dire questions. Based upon counsel’s
assurances at a hearing held the day before the scheduled trial
date that she felt adequately prepared, and was ready to proceed to
trial the following day, we conclude that the district court was
not unreasonable or arbitrary in denying the motion for a third
continuance the day before trial. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12.
Hussein also contends that the district court improperly
admitted documents allegedly submitted by Hussein and other co-
conspirators that falsely claimed a Virginia address. This court
reviews a district court’s decision as to the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion and will not find an abuse
unless a decision was “arbitrary and irrational.” United States v.
Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002).
The Federal Rules of Evidence forbid the entry of hearsay
except for specified exceptions including a business record created
in the normal course of business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The
essential premise underlying the business records exception is that
“each actor in the chain of information is under a business duty or
compulsion to provide accurate information.” United States v.
McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 699 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing to McCormick
on Evidence, § 290 at 274 (4th ed. 1992)). This provides the
requisite degree of trustworthiness. See McIntyre, 997 F.2d at
699. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the
records in question were reliably created and maintained in the
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normal course of DMV’s business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. Weaver, 282 F.3d at
313.
We also reject Hussein’s contention that DMV Special
Agent Kelly’s testimony that Hussein was the individual who
submitted the application and completed the driving test was
impermissible hearsay. After reviewing the testimony, we conclude
that Agent Kelly’s testimony was not offered to prove Hussein’s
identity, but instead offered to establish the content of properly
admitted business records. As Hussein concedes on appeal, the jury
was specifically charged with determining if the individual in the
photograph attached to the fraudulent application was in fact
Hussein. Accordingly, we conclude that Kelly’s testimony was not
impermissible hearsay, and find no abuse of discretion. Weaver,
282 F.3d at 313.
Finally, Hussein contends that the evidence failed to
show that he entered into an agreement to obtain false
identification records, or that he was the individual who submitted
false information to DMV representatives. This court must affirm
Hussein’s jury convictions if there is substantial evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to support
the jury’s verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). In determining whether the evidence is substantial, this
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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government and inquires whether there is evidence sufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). In evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence, the court does not review witness
credibility and assumes the jury resolved all contradictions of the
evidence in the government’s favor. United States v. Romer, 148
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). The jury, not the reviewing court,
weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts
in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different
reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which to believe.
United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994).
Circumstantial as well as direct evidence is considered, and the
government is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from
the facts proven to the facts sought to be established. United
States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
To prove conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), the
government must show an agreement to do something illegal, willing
participation by the defendant, and an overt act in furtherance of
the agreement. United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 97 (4th Cir.
1994). “By its very nature, a conspiracy is clandestine and
covert, thereby frequently resulting in little direct evidence of
such an agreement.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th
Cir. 1996). “Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be
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inferred from a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances.’”
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80 (citations omitted); see also Burgos, 94
F.3d at 858 (“Indeed, a conspiracy may be proved wholly by
circumstantial evidence.”). Moreover, “the fact that a conspiracy
is loosely knit, haphazard, or ill-conceived does not render it any
less a conspiracy,” and “a defendant may be a member of a
conspiracy without knowledge of or participation in its full
scope.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858, 866. “Once a conspiracy has been
proved, the evidence need only establish a slight connection
between any given defendant and the conspiracy to support
conviction.” United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 385 (4th
Cir. 2001). After careful review of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, and resolving all contradictions in
favor of the government, we find that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain Hussein’s conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(f); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1028(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(A), 2; Romer, 148 F.3d at 364;
Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862.
Accordingly, we affirm Hussein’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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