UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4195
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ALEJANDRO GARCIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CR-04-815)
Submitted: September 28, 2005 Decided: October 18, 2005
Before LUTTIG and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John H. Hare, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Scott Gasser, Acting United
States Attorney, Anne Hunter Young, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Alejandro Garcia appeals his conviction and twenty-four-
month sentence imposed after he pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000). Garcia’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising as potential issues the
district court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Garcia’s guilty plea and the reasonableness of Garcia’s sentence.
Counsel states, however, that in his view, there are no meritorious
issues for appeal. Garcia was informed of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
Counsel asserts that the district court committed three
errors in accepting Garcia’s guilty plea: (1) the court did not use
the exact language of Rule 11 when informing Garcia of the
consequences of providing false information during the plea
hearing, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A); (2) the court failed to
advise Garcia of any applicable forfeiture, see Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(J); and (3) the court did not inform Garcia that it still
may be obligated to apply the Sentencing Guidelines, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(M). Because Garcia did not move in the district
court to withdraw his guilty plea, we review his challenge to the
adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “plain
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error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error
in the Rule 11 context”).
We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the Rule 11
hearing and conclude that the alleged violations of Rule
11(b)(1)(A) and (M) are refuted by the record. With regard to the
district court’s failure to inform Garcia of any applicable
forfeiture, we find that the error did not affect Garcia’s
substantial rights. We therefore find no plain error in the
court’s acceptance of Garcia’s guilty plea.
Counsel also raises as a potential issue the
reasonableness of Garcia’s twenty-four-month sentence in light of
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Although the
Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes clear
that a sentencing court “must consult [the] Guidelines and take
them into account when sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767 (Breyer, J.,
opinion of the Court). The court should consider this sentencing
range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a sentence.
See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005)
(applying Booker on plain error review). The sentence must be
“within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”
Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted).
In sentencing Garcia, the district court considered the
properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and all of
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the factors in § 3553(a). Because the court sentenced Garcia at
the low end of the advisory Guideline range and well below the ten-
year statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005), we conclude that the sentence is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm Garcia’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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