UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2250
VINCENT F. STRAWBRIDGE, JR.; REBECCA S.
STRAWBRIDGE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
SUGAR MOUNTAIN RESORT, INCORPORATED; B. DALE
STANCIL, individually; THE SUGAR MOUNTAIN
IRREVOCABLE TRUST; THE B. DALE STANCIL
IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 04-2331
VINCENT F. STRAWBRIDGE, JR.; REBECCA S.
STRAWBRIDGE,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
SUGAR MOUNTAIN RESORT, INCORPORATED; B. DALE
STANCIL, individually; THE SUGAR MOUNTAIN
IRREVOCABLE TRUST; THE B. DALE STANCIL
IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CA-02-92)
Argued: September 19, 2005 Decided: October 28, 2005
Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and James C. DEVER,
III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: R. Hayes Hofler, III, HAYES HOFLER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Wyatt
Shorter Stevens, ROBERTS & STEVENS, P.A., Asheville, North
Carolina; James Robert Fox, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON BRIEF:
Daniel B. Hill, HAYES HOFLER & ASSOCIATES, P.A., Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Jennifer I. Oakes, BELL,
DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellees/Cross-Appellants B. Dale Stancil, The Sugar Mountain
Irrevocable Trust, The B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a defense verdict in a case
brought by Vincent and Rebecca Strawbridge against Sugar Mountain
Resort, Inc. (SMR), its alleged alter-ego, B. Dale Stancil, and two
trusts created by Stancil. (We will refer to the defendants as SMR
and Stancil.) Mr. Strawbridge was injured in a skiing accident at
the SMR resort. The Strawbridges contend that the district court
erred in refusing to allow them additional voir dire or grant a new
trial after the defense’s voir dire allegedly revealed that two
jurors had failed to respond to an important question posed by the
Strawbridges during their voir dire. The Strawbridges also claim
that the district court erred in excluding evidence about rocks at
the site of Mr. Strawbridge’s accident. Alternatively, the
Strawbridges argue that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to enforce a settlement agreement allegedly reached before
trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
The Strawbridges allege that on January 22, 1998, Mr.
Strawbridge skied over a ledge at SMR’s resort, where he hit a bare
spot of dirt, lost control, and fell. Mr. Strawbridge sustained
serious physical injuries. In their complaint, filed April 22,
2002, the Strawbridges asserted claims of negligence and loss of
consortium and sought both compensatory and punitive damages.
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Stancil was named as a defendant on the theory that SMR was his
alter ego. Stancil’s presence as a defendant was of moment because
SMR carried only $1 million in liability insurance.
SMR and Stancil filed motions for summary judgment on
December 1, 2003, and the motions were referred to the magistrate
judge. The magistrate judge held a hearing on these motions on
February 4, 2004, and two days later, on February 6, filed a
memorandum recommending the award of summary judgment to the
defendants on all claims. After considering the magistrate judge’s
recommendation de novo, the district judge granted summary judgment
to SMR on the Strawbridges’ request for punitive damages, but
otherwise denied the summary judgment motions. Strawbridge v.
Sugar Mountain Resort, 320 F. Supp. 2d 425 (W.D.N.C. 2004).
In the meantime the parties had been involved in
settlement negotiations. Prior to the February 4, 2004, summary
judgment hearing, the Strawbridges demanded $8 million to settle
their claims. Wyatt Stevens, the lawyer for SMR’s insurer, made a
$450,000 counteroffer, which the Strawbridges rejected. Shortly
after the February 4 hearing, a lawyer retained directly by SMR,
Robert Riddle, asked the Strawbridges to reconsider settlement.
The parties dispute the facts concerning subsequent
settlement negotiations. According to the Strawbridges’ lawyer,
Hayes Hofler, at approximately 11:00 a.m. on February 6, 2004,
Riddle made an offer to settle for the policy limits of $1 million,
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and Hofler accepted on behalf of the Strawbridges. The
Strawbridges allege that, after accepting, Hofler asked Riddle if
the payment could be structured as loss of future income in an
effort to avoid a $400,000 lien arising from Mr. Strawbridge’s
medical bills. The Strawbridges claim that Riddle responded that
he thought that approach would not be a problem and that he would
discuss it with Stevens. SMR disputes this account. It claims
that Hofler indicated that his clients (the Strawbridges) would
accept the policy limits of $1 million on the condition that
payment be structured as loss of future income. SMR insists that
because it never accepted this condition, the parties never reached
a settlement agreement.
In any event, later in the day of February 6, before
Stevens responded to Riddle about payment structuring, Stevens
learned that the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the
case. Shortly thereafter, Stevens contacted Riddle and told him
that a $1 million settlement, with the structuring condition, was
unacceptable. Around 5:00 p.m. Hofler (on behalf of the
Strawbridges) left a telephone message for Stevens in an effort to
confirm settlement. Stevens returned Hofler’s call around 5:30 and
told him that Riddle did not have authority to settle the case in
light of the Strawbridges’ request to structure payment.
In March 2004 the Strawbridges, claiming that a
settlement agreement had been reached, filed a motion to enforce
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it, and the district court held a hearing. After considering the
lawyers’ oral representations, their affidavits, and transcripts of
some of the telephone calls at issue, the court found that no
settlement had been reached because the parties never agreed to all
material terms of settlement.
The case proceeded to trial on July 12, 2004. During
voir dire the judge asked the jury panel some preliminary questions
related to possible bias, including: “Do[ any] of you have any
prejudices or biases that you know of that would affect your
ability to sit in a case of this kind involving a ski incident,
just simply by the reason of the nature of the sport or exercise,
whatever you wish to call it?” J.A. 1131. There was no
affirmative response. Later, the Strawbridges’ lawyer asked the
panel:
Do any of you have anybody, family, close family,
relatives, children, who is in any way involved in the
ski industry, not necessarily on the slopes themselves,
but maybe providing supplies to a resort or making
deliveries to a resort or going there to make repairs,
that kind of thing, in any way that might be remotely
connected with the ski industry?
J.A. 1144. There was no response. The Strawbridges passed on the
panel, and the defense side began its questioning. Defense counsel
asked whether any of the jurors knew anyone closely connected with
the ski industry. Juror Nicholson responded that the president of
the company for which he worked was a volunteer ski patroller who
might have worked for SMR. Juror McDonald reported that the son of
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one of her best friends owns a local ski shop. When defense
counsel passed on the panel, the Strawbridges requested that voir
dire be reopened to allow them to inquire of jurors Nicholson and
McDonald. This request was denied. At the close of evidence the
Strawbridges moved to strike jurors Nicholson and McDonald, and
this motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants on the seventh day of trial, and the district court
later denied the Strawbridges’ motion for a new trial that was
based on the claim of inadequate voir dire and juror bias.
The Strawbridges appeal the adverse rulings discussed
above. SMR cross-appeals the district court’s refusal to give a
jury instruction on assumption of risk, and Stancil cross-appeals
the court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the alter-
ego issue.
II.
A.
The Strawbridges contend that the district court erred in
refusing to reopen voir dire. They insist that the failure of the
two jurors (Nicholson and McDonald) to provide pertinent
information in response to their question about ties to the ski
industry prevented them from intelligently exercising their
peremptory challenges. We conclude that the district court did not
err in refusing to reopen voir dire. A trial judge has broad
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discretion in overseeing the conduct of voir dire, subject to
“essential demands of fairness.” Aldridge v. United States, 283
U.S. 308, 310 (1931); United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1049
(4th Cir. 1977). Trial judges “must reach conclusions as to [a
prospective juror’s] impartiality and credibility by relying on
their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to
questions.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188
(1981). An “appellate court [cannot] easily second-guess the
conclusions of [a trial judge] who heard and observed” a juror’s
responses and demeanor during voir dire. Id.
In the present case, the trial judge asked his own
preliminary questions on voir dire that were aimed at uncovering
any bias or prejudice relating to the sport of skiing. There was
no response that raised a red flag. In addition, the judge
observed the responses and demeanor of the two jurors in question.
The judge declined to reopen voir dire, reasoning that both sides
had been given adequate opportunity to question jurors, and all
jurors seated assured the judge that they could be fair and
impartial. The judge was satisfied that “had there been some bias
or prejudice that would affect [the jurors’] verdict . . . it would
have been uncovered” during voir dire. J.A. 1194. The trial judge
thus determined that the voir dire was adequate on matters of
potential bias. We have ample grounds for deferring to this
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determination, and we conclude that the judge did not err in
refusing to reopen voir dire.
B.
The Strawbridges also contend that they are entitled to
a new trial because the two jurors (Nicholson and McDonald) failed
to provide honest responses at voir dire. A new trial is warranted
when (1) a juror failed to answer a material question honestly on
voir dire, even if the failure was innocent, and (2) a correct
response would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984). The question the Strawbridges posed to the panel was:
Do any of you have anybody, family, close family,
relatives, children, who is in any way involved in the
ski industry, not necessarily on the slopes themselves,
but maybe providing supplies to a resort or making
deliveries to a resort or going there to make repairs,
that kind of thing, in any way that might be remotely
connected with the ski industry?
J.A. 1144. The Strawbridges maintain that because the question
contained the word “anybody,” the two jurors were dishonest when
they did not respond with information about non-familial ties to
the ski industry.
A new trial is not warranted because, as the district
judge found, the jurors did not respond dishonestly to the
Strawbridges’ question. According to the trial judge, the most
logical interpretation of the question is that it was limited to
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potential jurors’ family ties to the ski industry. This
interpretation led the judge to conclude that the jurors’ responses
were neither inconsistent nor dishonest. We agree with the judge’s
analysis. The Strawbridges’ inability to obtain the information
they sought during voir dire is attributable to their failure to
state their question clearly, not the jurors’ failure to answer the
question honestly.
C.
The Strawbridges further argue that they are entitled to
a new trial based on the actual bias of jurors Nicholson and
McDonald or the trial court’s error in denying a hearing (including
further questioning) on the issue of actual bias. A showing that
a juror was actually biased, regardless of whether the juror was
truthful or deceitful, can entitle a party to a new trial. Jones
v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2002). A trial court has
broad discretion to determine whether to order a hearing on a claim
of juror bias. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir.
1998).
The Strawbridges have simply made no showing that either
Nicholson or McDonald was a biased juror. Moreover, we have
reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court did not abuse
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its discretion in declining to hold a hearing or permit further
questioning on the issue of actual bias.
III.
The Strawbridges argue that the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence showing that rocks existed on the area of the
slope where Mr. Strawbridge fell. Because Mr. Strawbridge
testified that he encountered a bare spot of dirt (he did not
mention rocks), the court did not err in excluding evidence of
rocks on the basis that it was not relevant under Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 402.
IV.
The Strawbridges argue that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to enforce a settlement agreement they
allegedly reached with SMR. A court should enforce a settlement
agreement when the partes have agreed on all material terms. Piver
v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Cir. 1987);
Boyce v. McMahan, 208 S.E.2d 692, 695 (N.C. 1974). After holding
a hearing on the settlement question and carefully reviewing the
facts, the district court found that there was no meeting of the
minds. Riddle, SMR’s lawyer, considered the deal to be conditioned
upon the Strawbridges’ requirement that payment be structured as
loss of future income. The Strawbridges argue that the court
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should enforce the agreement because payment structure was not a
material condition. However, as the district court found, payment
structure was material because the defense side feared exposure to
liability on Mr. Strawbridge’s medical liens. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the alleged
settlement agreement.
V.
Because our rulings on the voir dire, jury bias,
evidentiary, and settlement issues mean that the jury’s finding of
no liability on the part of the defendants will stand, we have no
reason to reach the Strawbridges’ argument that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to SMR on the issue of punitive
damages. Likewise, because the judgment for the defendants will be
affirmed, we will not consider the issues raised in the defendants’
cross-appeals. The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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