UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4687
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
PAUL LEE JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.
(S. Ct. No. 04-8238)
Submitted: September 28, 2005 Decided: November 22, 2005
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Cipriani, CIPRIANI & PAULL, L.C., Wellsburg, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Thomas E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Thomas
O. Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Paul Lee Jackson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute in excess of fifty grams of
crack and two counts of distribution of crack in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (2000). He was sentenced to 240 months
in prison and five years of supervised release. We affirmed his
conviction and sentence. United States v. Jackson, No. 03-4687,
2004 WL 2165640 (4th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004) (unpublished).
Jackson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court. His petition was granted, and this
court’s judgment was vacated, in light of the decision in United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Jackson v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1419 (2005). Jackson’s case has been remanded to this
Court for further proceedings.
Jackson’s sentence was imposed prior to the decisions in
Booker and its predecessor, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004). Jackson did not raise objections to his sentence based on
the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines or the district
court’s application of sentencing enhancements based on facts not
admitted by Jackson or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, we review his sentence for plain error. See United
States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005).
In Booker, the Supreme Court applied the rationale of
Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines and held that the
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mandatory guidelines scheme that provided for sentence enhancements
based on facts found by the court by a preponderance of the
evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746-
48, 755-56 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court remedied
the constitutional violation by severing two statutory provisions,
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring sentencing
courts to impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines
range), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (setting
forth appellate standards of review for guideline issues), thereby
making the guidelines advisory. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546 (citing
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757, 764 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court)).
We conclude that the determination that Jackson was
responsible for a drug quantity of at least 150 grams but less than
500 grams of cocaine base was error under the Sixth Amendment as
applied in Booker, because the facts supporting this enhancement
were not alleged in the indictment or admitted by Jackson.* Based
on the facts present in the indictment, Jackson was responsible for
in excess of fifty grams of cocaine base, resulting in a total
offense level of thirty-two, instead of the level thirty-four used
by the district court. Together with a criminal history category
*
Just as we noted in Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of
course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the
law and procedure in effect at the time” of Jackson’s sentencing.
See generally Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)
(stating that an error is “plain” if “the law at the time of trial
was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal”).
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of V, Jackson’s guideline range would be 188 to 235 months of
imprisonment. Because the 240-month sentence imposed does not fall
within the guidelines range calculated without the improper
enhancement, Jackson’s sentence constitutes plain error that
affects his substantial rights and requires resentencing pursuant
to Booker and Hughes.
We therefore vacate Jackson’s sentence and remand for
resentencing consistent with Booker and its progeny. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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