UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4217
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
PAUL A. SCHYBAL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Chief
District Judge. (CR-04-116)
Submitted: October 26, 2005 Decided: November 21, 2005
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey Warner,
United States Attorney, W. Chad Noel, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Paul A. Schybal of mailing a threatening
letter, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 876 (West Supp. 2005). The
district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Schybal asserts that insufficient evidence supported his
conviction and that his sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.
Schybal contends that, although he wrote the letter at
issue, there is no evidence that he was the one who mailed it. He
was a prison inmate when the letter was mailed, and he points to
the nearly two month time gap between the date on the letter and
date of the postmark to show that anyone could have found the
letter and mailed it. We must uphold a jury’s verdict of guilty if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support it.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In determining
whether the evidence is substantial, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government, and inquire whether there
is evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th
Cir. 1996). In order to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 876, a
defendant must have knowingly deposited a threatening communication
in the mail. United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.
1991).
Here, the evidence is undisputed. Schybal wrote and
addressed a threatening letter to a corrections officer. He had
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written and sent similar letters in the past to the same officer,
as well as to another prison employee. He resided in the prison on
the date the threatening letter signed and addressed by him was
sent from the prison. We find that the evidence was sufficient to
conclude that Schybal sent the letter at issue. See Petschl v.
United States, 369 F.2d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1966)(holding that proof
of mailing and causing mailing may be shown by circumstantial
evidence).
Schybal, who was sentenced after the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), argues
that his sentence was unreasonable because it was greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and because it did not address his mental
illness. Following Booker, we review a sentence for
reasonableness, and the district court is required to consider the
guideline range, as well as the other factors in § 3553(a). See
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). The
factors in § 3553(a) include: (1) the nature and circumstances of
the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(3) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment and rehabilitation; (4) the need to protect the public;
and (5) the guidelines range.
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In this case, the record reflects that the district court
adequately and properly considered the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. The court noted the seriousness of the offense, Schybal’s
criminal history, the need for maximum deterrence, the threat to
the victims, and the guideline range. While Schybal contends that
he needs only strict home confinement and medical treatment, we
hold that the district court properly considered the statutory
factors and appropriately arrived at a sentence. We can find no
basis to conclude that Schybal’s sentence is unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Schybal’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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