UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1739
KIRK E. WEBSTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DONALD H. RUMSFELD, Secretary of Defense;
JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., National Imagery and
Mapping Agency,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (CA-03-
924-RWT)
Argued: September 19, 2005 Decided: December 1, 2005
Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
King joined. Judge Gregory wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
ARGUED: David A. Branch, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Tarra R.
DeShields-Minnis, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Allen F. Loucks, United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
2
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Kirk E. Webster brought this action against the Secretary of
Defense for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(West 2003), while employed with the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (“NIMA” or “Agency”) of the Department of Defense, and for
NIMA’s alleged breach of a settlement agreement. Prior to
discovery, NIMA filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
and the district court granted summary judgment. We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.
Webster, an African-American male, was employed by NIMA as a
cartographer in 1988 and, beginning in 1993, worked the night shift
on the DE Alpha cartography system. In 1997, Webster filed an
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint of race
discrimination against NIMA, which the parties settled by written
agreement. On April 5, 2000, Webster initiated a second EEO
complaint against NIMA, alleging that he had been subjected to
adverse employment actions during 1999 and 2000 that were motivated
by racial discrimination and in retaliation for his prior EEO
activity. Webster was a GS-11 level employee at the time.
Pending a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
Webster and NIMA engaged in settlement negotiations. In September
3
2001, Webster’s counsel sent an e-mail message to NIMA’s counsel,
purporting to confirm several terms of a settlement agreement
between them, including (1) that Webster would receive a
retroactive promotion to Pay Band IV (equivalent to GS-13, Step 5)
from September 1999 through March 2000, and a retroactive promotion
within Pay Bank IV (equivalent to GS-14, Step 1) from March 2000
forward, as well as back pay in a lump-sum amount; (2) that Webster
would receive retroactive agency contributions to his Thrift
Savings Plan to reflect the back pay and merit increases, and (3)
that the Agency would annotate Webster’s 2001 performance appraisal
to reflect that his position was the equivalent of a Job Lead
position. Webster’s counsel also advised the ALJ of the settlement
negotiations and informed the ALJ that the request for an
administrative hearing would be withdrawn subject to final
confirmation of the settlement terms. On October 2, 2001, the ALJ
dismissed Webster’s complaint.
On October 17, 2001, the parties executed a written Settlement
Agreement in which NIMA agreed to (1) promote Webster to Pay Band
IV, retroactive to September 6, 1999, to include back pay; (2) pay
Webster’s attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $15,987
directly to counsel within 30 days of the execution of the
agreement; (3) pay Webster $10,000 for compensatory damages and
$770 for out-of-pocket medical expenses; and (4) restore 40 hours
of sick leave and 40 hours of annual leave. In return, Webster
4
agreed to relinquish all pending administrative complaints and
waived the right to assert the claims in court. Webster
acknowledged and agreed that there were “no other terms,
obligations or conditions of this agreement for either party to
this agreement, except those expressly stated herein.” J.A. 135.
In December 2001, Webster’s counsel advised NIMA’s counsel
that Webster had not received back pay for his promotion to GS-13,
Step 5, from September 1999 to March 2000, or for his promotion to
the GS-14, Step 1, from March 2000 to the present. Webster asserts
that NIMA’s EEO Complaint Manager John Sutkowsky advised Webster
that he would be promoted to GS-14 effective in the last pay check
for the month of December 2001, but later advised Webster
(consistent with the written agreement) that NIMA had only agreed
to a promotion to Pay Band IV (at GS-13, Step 1).
In January 2002, Webster notified the EEO Director and
Sutkowsky that NIMA had breached the settlement agreement by
failing to (1) retroactively promote him to GS-13, Step 5, and GS-
14, Step 1; (2) make retroactive contributions to his Thrift
Savings Plan; (3) annotate his 2001 performance appraisal; and (4)
timely pay his attorneys’ fees. NIMA admitted that the attorneys’
fee payment was technically late because NIMA had erroneously sent
the check to Webster instead of Webster’s attorney, but denied that
it had agreed to the other terms, which had been set forth in
Webster’s e-mail prior to execution of the written settlement
5
agreement, but not included in the final agreement. With the
exception of the attorneys’ fee error, NIMA advised Webster that
“the settlement terms are clear and unambiguous, and the terms have
been executed as promised.” J.A. 141.
In March 2002, Webster filed a third EEO complaint, alleging
that NIMA had breached the settlement agreement and discriminated
against him because of his race and in retaliation for his prior
EEO activity. The EEOC Office of Federal Operations held that
Webster had not shown a breach of the settlement agreement and
agreed with NIMA’s rejection of the claim. On November 4, 2002,
Webster initiated this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging breach of the settlement
agreement, discrimination and retaliation. The case was
transferred to the District of Maryland on March 7, 2003.
In the summer and fall of 2002, while Webster’s third EEO
complaint was pending administrative review, Webster alleges that
a number of adverse changes occurred in his employment. Although
the cartographers had been advised that the DE Alpha workstations
were going to be replaced by IEC workstations during the 2004/2005
fiscal year, the replacement occurred ahead of schedule. By
November 2002, the DE Alpha workstations had been replaced in the
NIMA East location, Webster had been reassigned to a different
branch and office, and was no longer working as a DE Alpha
cartographer. By the end of the year, Webster’s work role was
6
formally changed to Geospatial Analyst, a position in which Webster
claims he had expressed no interest and had no skills to perform.
Also in the fall of 2002, Webster received a downgraded annual
evaluation. Although his performance appraisal was termed
“excellent,” he was not recommended for promotion to Pay Band V and
did not obtain a numerical rating high enough to qualify for a
bonus. According to Webster’s supervisor, who had recommended
Webster for promotion in earlier years, Webster was not recommended
in 2002 because he needed to be “more front and center” and “get
[himself] out a little more.” J.A. 40 (internal quotation marks
omitted). According to Webster, the DE Alpha workstations remained
in production in NIMA West until February 2004 and cartographers
similarly situated to him continued to receive promotions.
In January 2003, Webster filed his fourth EEO complaint,
alleging that the changes to his work role, and the subsequent
denial of a promotion recommendation and bonus, were due to
continued racial discrimination and retaliation. Webster did not
participate in the administrative investigation and planned instead
to amend his federal complaint to assert these claims.
The year 2003 brought more changes. Webster again received a
performance rating of “excellent,” as well as a salary increase,
but he failed to garner a score sufficient to qualify for a bonus.
Webster was also moved from night shift to day shift in August
2003, which resulted in the loss of a pay differential.
7
As noted above, Webster’s complaint was transferred to the
Maryland district court in March 2003, but no discovery had taken
place. Given Webster’s mounting complaints, the parties filed a
joint motion to stay discovery and a consent motion for leave to
allow Webster to file an amended complaint to assert the additional
claims of discrimination and retaliation once the administrative
proceedings were exhausted. The motion was granted and Webster
filed his amended complaint in November 2003, asserting, in
addition to the breach of settlement claim, claims that the change
in his job title and duties, his lower performance ratings, his
failure to be recommended for promotions and bonuses, and his
reassignment from the night shift to the day shift were motivated
by racial and retaliatory animus.
In January 2004, NIMA filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. NIMA’s motion was supported by
a number of documents, e-mails and affidavits executed by NIMA
officials which essentially claimed that the changes to Webster’s
job were the result of a restructuring that had taken place within
NIMA and Webster’s subsequent, less-than-stellar job performance.
In response, Webster filed an affidavit setting forth his
personal knowledge of the pending claims and a “Certification”
averring “under penalty of perjury that pursuant to Rule 56(f) [he
could not] present by affidavit or otherwise facts essential to
rebut factual assertions made by defendants without engaging in
8
discovery.” J.A. 98. Specifically, he asserted a need to depose
Sutkowsky, as well as Agency counsel Jack Rickert, to prove “that
the Agency agreed to terms other than those set forth in the
settlement agreement,” and a need to conduct discovery regarding
“the circumstances surrounding [his] change from evening shift to
day shift and the change in [his] work role, as well as the
objective standards for issuing [him] an evaluation in FY 2002
which resulted in denial of promotion recommendation and denial of
bonuses in FY 2003 and FY 2004, and how similarly situated co-
workers were evaluated.” J.A. 98-99.
On April 21, 2004, the district court denied Webster’s request
to conduct discovery and granted summary judgment to NIMA. The
district court ruled that Webster’s Rule 56(f) request was
deficient because it was labeled a “certification” instead of an
“affidavit,” was based upon Webster’s “knowledge, information, and
belief,” instead of his “personal knowledge,” and lacked the
requisite specificity regarding the discovery sought. With regard
to the merits, the district court ruled that the breach of
settlement claim failed because Webster sought to include terms not
included in the executed contract, and that the Title VII claims
failed because he had not identified any adverse employment action
that had been taken against him. The district court also ruled
that Webster had failed to exhaust his claim that the reassignment
from night shift to day shift was the result of retaliation.
9
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, see Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162,
1167 (4th Cir. 1988), construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment
is well-settled. Summary judgment should be granted only “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Nguyen
v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Once he has done so, the nonmoving party “may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials,” id. (internal quotation
marks omitted), but must “go beyond the pleadings and, by his own
affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.’ Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
As a general rule, however, summary judgment is not
appropriate prior to the completion of discovery. See id. at 322
10
(“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (emphasis
added)). Rule 56(f) provides the district court with the
discretionary authority, in appropriate cases, to deny a premature
motion for summary judgment where the nonmoving party demonstrates
that he has not had adequate time for discovery or needs additional
time to complete it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (“Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just”); see also
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326. Thus, “the non-moving party’s duty to
respond specifically to a summary judgment motion is expressly
qualified by Rule 56(f)’s requirement that summary judgment be
refused where the non-moving party has not had the opportunity to
‘discover information that is essential to his opposition.’” Strag
v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5
(noting that Rule 56(e) requirement that the nonmoving party come
11
forth with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial
“is qualified by Rule 56(f)’s provision that summary judgment be
refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to
discover information that is essential to his opposition”);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326 (“Any potential problem with [a] premature
[summary judgment motion] can be adequately dealt with under Rule
56(f), which allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the
hearing on the motion to be continued, if the nonmoving party has
not had an opportunity to make full discovery.” (footnote
omitted)).
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for
an abuse of discretion. See Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242. However,
“[t]he denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for extension should be
affirmed where the additional evidence sought for discovery would
not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag, 55 F.3d at 954; see
also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (“Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes
that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”).
12
III.
With these standards in mind, we begin with Webster’s
contention that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on his breach of settlement claim and erred in refusing to
allow him to conduct discovery into the terms of the settlement.
Settlement agreements are contracts and are therefore governed
by general principles of contract law. See Byrum v. Bear Inv. Co.,
936 F.2d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1991). “[W]hen a written contract is
clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court, not the jury,
to determine its meaning.” Nehi Bottling Co. v. All-American
Bottling Corp., 8 F.3d 157, 161 (4th Cir. 1993). The parties’
intent may be “discerned from the four corners of the contract.”
United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1991).
In the instant case, the terms of the settlement agreement are
quite specific. NIMA agreed to (1) promote Webster to Pay Band IV,
retroactive to September 6, 1999; (2) pay Webster’s attorneys’ fees
and costs directly to counsel within 30 days; (3) pay Webster
$10,000 for compensatory damages and $770 for out-of-pocket medical
expenses; and (4) restore 40 hours of sick leave and 40 hours of
annual leave to him. Webster agreed to relinquish all pending
administrative complaints, waived the right to assert these claims
in court, and agreed that there were “no other terms, obligations
or conditions of this agreement for either party to this agreement,
except those expressly stated herein.” J.A. 135.
13
With the exception of Webster’s claim that NIMA breached the
provision that his attorneys’ fees be timely paid, however,
Webster’s claim is not that NIMA breached the terms set forth in
the written settlement agreement, but rather that NIMA breached
terms that the parties failed to include in the written settlement
agreement. These additional terms find their origin in the
unilateral e-mail sent by Webster’s counsel to NIMA’s counsel
during the course of the settlement negotiations, prior to
execution of the written settlement document.
Webster argues that NIMA acknowledged receipt of the
settlement e-mail from Webster’s attorney and, thereby, agreed to
its terms as well. NIMA, on the other hand, denies that it ever
agreed to these terms and asserts that this was communicated to
Webster’s counsel via a telephone call placed after the e-mail
message. From this alleged factual dispute, Webster asserts an
entitlement to discovery regarding the “actual” terms of the
settlement agreement, specifically the right to depose Rickert and
Sutkowsky to demonstrate “that the Agency agreed to terms other
than those set forth in the settlement agreement.” J.A. 98.
We are unpersuaded. The written contract is clear and
unambiguous, does not include the terms from the e-mail message
that Webster seeks to enforce, and cannot be varied by extrinsic
evidence. We also agree that Webster failed to demonstrate a need
for further discovery on this claim. The information Webster seeks
14
to establish via the requested depositions is not relevant or
necessary to the resolution of his breach of contract claim, and
would not create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NIMA on
Webster’s breach of contract claim.1
IV.
We turn now to Webster’s claim that the changes in his work
role, his lowered performance ratings, his failure to receive
promotion recommendations and bonuses, and his transfer from the
night shift to the day shift were the result of race discrimination
and retaliation for his prior EEO activity, as well as his claim
that the district court erred in refusing to allow him an
opportunity to explore these claims through discovery.
1
Webster’s claim that NIMA failed to timely pay his attorneys’
fees is undisputed. The parties agree that the check was
inadvertently sent to Webster instead of his attorney and,
therefore, not made within 30 days. NIMA issued a second check to
Webster’s attorney in March 2002 and, thereafter, Webster returned
the money he had erroneously received the previous November. It
was also undisputed that Webster suffered no damage as a result of
the late payment to counsel. Thus, the district court correctly
observed that NIMA’s failure to pay the attorneys’ fees in a timely
manner was not a substantial or material breach of the settlement
agreement and that, even if it were, NIMA was entitled to summary
judgment because Webster suffered no damages.
15
A.
Webster seeks to establish his claims of race discrimination
under the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corporation
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, Webster must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., that
(1) he “is a member of a protected class”; (2) that he “suffered
adverse employment action”; (3) that he “was performing [his] job
duties at a level that met [his] employer’s legitimate expectations
at the time of the adverse employment action”; and (4) the adverse
employment action occurred under circumstances raising an inference
of unlawful discrimination. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). If
established, the burden then shifts to the defendant to come
forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment decision. See id. If the defendant meets
this burden, the onus returns to Webster to demonstrate that the
reason is pretextual and that discrimination was the motivating
force behind the decision. See id.
Webster’s retaliation claim also proceeds under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. See Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134
F.3d 1222, 1228 (4th Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “engaged in a
protected activity,” that his employer “took an adverse employment
action against [him],” and that “a causal connection existed
16
between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action.”
Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court granted summary judgment because
Webster failed to establish any adverse employment action. See
James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.
2004) (noting that “[r]egardless of the route a plaintiff follows
in proving a Title VII action, the existence of some adverse
employment action is required”) (internal citation and footnote
omitted). And, the district court concluded that Webster failed to
specify sufficiently the need for further discovery on these
issues. For the following reasons, we hold that, with the
exception of Webster’s claim arising from his transfer from the
night shift to the day shift, the district court prematurely
granted summary judgment to NIMA on Webster’s Title VII claims.
B.
“An adverse employment action is a discriminatory act which
adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the
plaintiff’s employment. Conduct short of ultimate employment
decisions can constitute adverse employment action.” Id. at 375-76
(internal citation, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). “A
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
17
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (emphasis added).
Thus, a reassignment can “form the basis of a valid Title VII
claim if the plaintiff can show that the reassignment had some
significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253,
256 (4th Cir. 1999). However, a mere change in an employee’s job
assignment, even if “less appealing to the employee, . . . does not
constitute adverse employment action.” Booz-Allen, 368 F.3d at
376. “Absent any decrease in compensation, job title, level of
responsibility, or opportunity for promotion, reassignment to a new
position commensurate with one’s salary level does not constitute
an adverse employment action even if the new job does cause some
modest stress not present in the old position.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
As an initial premise, we note that Webster has been afforded
no opportunity to conduct discovery into his claims of
discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary
judgment not because Webster had no evidence of discriminatory or
retaliatory motives, but because he had failed to allege an adverse
employment action as a matter of law. We disagree. In his
complaint and affidavit filed in opposition to the motion to
dismiss and for summary judgment, Webster asserts that NIMA changed
his job from cartographer to geospatial analyst, even though he did
18
not have the skills to perform in this new position, that he
thereafter received lower evaluation ratings from his supervisor (a
fact that does not appear to be disputed by NIMA) and that,
although his evaluations were termed “excellent,” his numerical
score was insufficient to qualify him for the yearly bonuses and
promotion recommendations that he had previously enjoyed. This
reassignment and its accompanying financial impact took place
shortly after Webster filed EEO complaints alleging race
discrimination and retaliation. He further asserts that similarly
situated employees were not reclassified and continued to advance
in their careers.
Under the circumstances, Webster has alleged adverse
employment actions sufficient to at least pursue discovery into his
claims. As noted above, a reassignment can “form the basis of a
valid Title VII claim if the plaintiff can show that the
reassignment had some significant detrimental effect,” such as a
“decrease in compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or
opportunity for promotion.” Boone 178 F.3d at 256-57; see also Von
Gunton v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 867 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
“downgrade of a performance evaluation could effect a term,
condition, or benefit of employment”). Webster has alleged and
presented at least some evidence that the changes in his job and
evaluations that occurred in 2002 had a significant detrimental
19
effect upon him because they resulted in his not being recommended
for promotions and his being denied bonuses.
NIMA contends that Webster’s job changes were the result of
internal reorganization and that he was not recommended for a
promotion and denied bonuses because he was not an exceptional
employee. That may be, but Webster has had no opportunity to
conduct discovery on his claims, which could very well matter. For
example, Webster argues that he cannot respond to NIMA’s position
that the bonus was discretionary and that it was denied based upon
his job performance, as Webster has been unable to obtain discovery
concerning the bonus policy, the reasons underlying the denial of
the benefits to him, or the manner in which similarly-situated
employees were treated in this regard. Similarly, NIMA argues that
it was entitled to summary judgment because Webster was required to
point to someone who was similarly situated, outside his protected
class, and who was recommended for a promotion. NIMA glosses over
the fact, however, that this is precisely the allegation that
Webster seeks to establish through discovery.
For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by NIMA’s claim that
Webster’s Rule 56(f) affidavit was deficient. Webster filed
affidavits setting forth the facts upon which he held personal
knowledge and filed a certification stating that he needed
additional discovery of NIMA personnel to corroborate his claims of
discrimination and retaliation. Given the lack of any discovery
20
and the lack of any meaningful opportunity on Webster’s part to
conduct discovery, we are satisfied that Webster’s Rule 56(f)
certification,2 along with his Rule 56(e) affidavit, were
sufficient to alert the court of the need for some discovery. Cf.
Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242 (affirming denial of discovery pursuant to
Rule 56(f) where plaintiff failed to file any affidavit); Strag, 55
F.3d at 953 (finding affidavit, filed after discovery had been
conducted, was insufficient because it made only vague assertions
as to the additional discovery sought). In sum, although we
express no opinion as to the ultimate merit of Webster’s claims (or
whether they might ultimately survive summary judgment), we hold
that the district court prematurely dismissed Webster’s claims that
his reassignment, lowered evaluations, and denials of promotion
recommendations and bonuses that resulted, were adverse employment
actions motivated by discriminatory and retaliatory animus.
Accordingly, we remand the case for further discovery.
2
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 (West 1994) (“Wherever, under any law
of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or
requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the
sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or
affidavit, in writing of the person making the same . . ., such
matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate,
verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is
subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in
substantially the following form: . . . (2) If executed within the
United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: “I
declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. . . .”).
21
C.
We affirm, however, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to NIMA on Webster’s claim is that his transfer from the
night shift, which paid better, to the day shift was retaliatory.
Although we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that
Webster was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before
amending his federal complaint to include this additional
retaliation claim,3 we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as to the merits of the claim.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Webster,
Webster cannot demonstrate a viable claim that the shift change was
made with a retaliatory motive. Webster and seventeen other
employees were notified that their night shift was being eliminated
due to a decreased workload, but were also invited to inform the
employer if the transfer to the day shift would create a hardship
upon any of them in terms of child care and the like. Webster “did
not object to the day shift change because his supervisor made it
clear that if he was going to advance, that he needed to accept
this change from a night shift to a day shift.” J.A. 521.
3
See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that “a separate administrative charge is not [a]
prerequisite to a suit complaining about retaliation for filing the
first charge” (internal quotation marks omitted)); King v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that
the scope of a Title VII suit is limited to those discrimination
claims stated in the initial EEO charge, claims reasonably related
to the original complaint, and claims developed by reasonable
investigation of the original complaint).
22
Accordingly, even if Webster could demonstrate that the loss of his
night shift differential occurred and that it was an adverse
employment action, he cannot demonstrate that he was singled out
and transferred to the day shift in retaliation for his engaging in
protected activities. We therefore affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as to this claim.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court
granting summary judgment to NIMA is hereby affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, AND REMANDED
23
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the
district court properly granted NIMA’s motion for summary judgment
on Webster’s breach of contract claim regarding his promotion to
Pay Band IV and his retaliation claim regarding his lateral
transfer, as set forth in Sections III and IV.C, respectively. In
my view, discovery into both of those matters was necessary prior
to entering summary judgment against Webster. I concur with the
majority’s opinion in all other respects.
I.
The majority asserts that the terms of the settlement
agreement between Webster and NIMA were “quite specific,” “clear,”
and “unambiguous.” Op. at 12, 13. The majority thus concludes
that the discovery Webster requested regarding his promotion to Pay
Band IV was neither relevant nor necessary to resolving his breach
of contract claim. Op. at 13. However, I find that discovery was
warranted to clarify the meaning of the term “Pay Band 4” prior to
entering summary judgment on this claim.
We generally apply commercial contract principles to
government contract claims. United Kingdom Ministry of Def. v.
Trimble Navigation Ltd., 422 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002);
United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir.
24
2001)). For instance, “[i]f the terms of the contract are clear
and unambiguous, then we must afford those terms their plain and
ordinary meaning; however, if the terms are vague or ambiguous,
then we may consider extrinsic evidence to interpret those
provisions.” Providence Square Assocs., LLC v. G.D.F., Inc., 211
F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A
contract is ambiguous where it is capable “of admitting of two or
more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of
referring to two or more things at the same time.” Nehi Bottling
Co. v. All-American Bottling Corp., 8 F.3d 157, 161 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The settlement agreement states that “[t]he agency will
promote the complainant to Pay Band 4, retroactive to 6 September
1999 within 30 days of the date that all parties have signed this
agreement.” J.A. 134. However, the term “Pay Band 4” is ambiguous
since it potentially refers to more than one GS-level and several
steps to which Webster could have been promoted. Although the
record is unclear as to the precise scope of Pay Band IV, Webster’s
supervisor testified that Pay Band IV was approximately the
equivalent of GS-13. J.A. 309.1 Webster has asserted that NIMA
1
According to the 1999 pay table issued by the United States
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), GS-13, Step 1 establishes
an annual base compensation of $53,793, while GS-13, Step 10
establishes an annual base compensation of $69,930. See
http://www.opm.gov/oca/99TABLES/GSannual/fsc/99GSf.htm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2005). GS-14, Step 1 sets forth an annual base
compensation of $63,567, while GS-14, Step 10 sets forth an annual
25
promoted him to GS-13, Step 2, which is within Pay Band IV, instead
of promoting him to GS-13, Step 5, which could also be within Pay
Band IV. J.A. 140.2 Moreover, the settlement agreement on its
face provides no clarification into the precise nature of Webster’s
promotion. Contrary to what the majority suggests, Webster’s
breach of contract claim regarding his promotion therefore rests
entirely on the ambiguity of the term “Pay Band 4,” as it is
employed in the settlement agreement, as opposed to terms
unincorporated into the agreement.
I find that discovery regarding the intent of the parties was
necessary with respect to the term “Pay Band 4” prior to entering
summary judgment on Webster’s breach of contract claim. Yet the
district court denied Webster’s Rule 56(f) motion to conduct
depositions of NIMA counsel Jack Rickert and EEO Complaints Manager
John Sutkowsky regarding the precise GS-level and step contemplated
base compensation of $82,638. Id. The official NIMA web site does
not provide information regarding Pay Band IV, as it was
established in 1999, but states that, as of January 9, 2005, Pay
Band IV encompasses an annual base compensation range of $64,478 to
$104,133 and is the equivalent of GS-13 through GS-14.
http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/nga01/index.jsp?epi-content=GENERI
C&itemID=85286150617abf00VgnVCMServer3c02010aRCRD&beanID=16296300
80&viewID=Article (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
2
According to the 1999 OPM pay table, GS-13, Step 5 yields an
annual base compensation of $60,965, while GS-13, Step 2 yields an
annual base compensation of $55,586. J.A. 146.
To the extent that Webster further asserts that the parties
had agreed to promote him retroactively to GS-14, Step 1 from March
2000, however, this second promotion is not incorporated into the
settlement agreement and is therefore barred on the face of the
agreement.
26
for his promotion. J.A. 98, 536-37. Accordingly, I conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in denying Webster’s
motion for discovery regarding his promotion, and erred in granting
summary judgment on this claim. See Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d
234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245 (4th Cir. 2002).
II.
The majority further acknowledges that Webster’s transfer and
attendant loss of night pay differential could be considered an
adverse employment action for the purposes of his retaliation
claim. Op. at 21. The majority nevertheless concludes that, even
if the transfer constituted an adverse employment action, Webster
“cannot demonstrate that he was singled out and transferred to the
day shift in retaliation for his engaging in protected activities.”
Id. In so doing, the majority relies on Webster’s counsel’s
representation at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment
that Webster “did not object to the day shift change because his
supervisor made it clear that if he was going to advance, that he
needed to accept this change from the night shift to a day shift.”
J.A. 521.
The majority thus suggests that Webster himself viewed the
transfer as a positive change, to the extent that he cannot show
pretext. However, the record reflects that when Webster’s first-
27
line supervisor, David Bialek, directly asked him whether he had
any concerns regarding the transfer, Webster “gave me the
impression that he felt it was mandatory and that he had no
choice.” J.A. 232. Construed fairly, Webster’s failure to object
to the transfer reveals his sense of futility regarding the
situation, rather than any perceived concurrence with his
employer’s view that the transfer would enhance his promotion
opportunities.
Even assuming that Webster could increase his promotion
opportunities by heightened visibility on the day shift, Webster
never had the opportunity to demonstrate that this reason was not
the true reason for his transfer, but was merely a pretext for
retaliation. By ending the analysis with NIMA’s proffered reason,
the majority skips the third step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework, which affords Webster the opportunity to show
pretext or other evidence probative of retaliation. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (noting that after
the employer presents its nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the plaintiff “must . . . be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason . . . was
in fact pretext”); see also Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13,
18 (2d Cir. 1995) (summary judgment inappropriate where the
plaintiff, who admitted that he engaged in forgery, never had the
opportunity to demonstrate that his “forgery of physicians’
28
signatures was not the true reason he was discharged, but was
merely a pretext and that his discharge was motivated by
discrimination”); Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23,
28 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys. Inc., 109 F.3d
173, 183 (3d Cir. 1997).
Significantly, information regarding the circumstances of
Webster’s transfer was exclusively in the hands of his employer.
Yet NIMA moved for summary judgment prior to the taking of any
discovery, thereby precluding Webster from opposing the motion in
a meaningful way. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 n.5 (1986) (summary judgment inappropriate where “the
nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information
that is essential to his opposition”); Harrods, 302 F.3d at 246-47
(“‘[S]ufficient time for discovery is considered especially
important when the relevant facts are exclusively in the control of
the opposing party.’”) (quoting 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2741, at 419
(3d ed. 1998)). Accordingly, I conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Webster’s motion for discovery
regarding his transfer pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and erred in granting summary judgment on this
claim at that juncture. See Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242; Harrods, 302
F.3d at 245.
29