UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4832
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
HENRY HILL, SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.
(S. Ct. No. 04-7501)
Submitted: October 7, 2005 Decided: December 20, 2005
Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Craig W. Sampson, SAMPSON LAW FIRM, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Sara E. Flannery, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
This case is before us on remand from the United States
Supreme Court for further consideration in light of United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In United States v. Hill,
No. 03-4832 (4th Cir. July 29, 2004) (unpublished), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 1085 (2005), we affirmed Hill’s conviction and 188-month
sentence imposed by the district court after a jury convicted Hill
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
less than five grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2000). After reviewing Hill’s appeal in light of Booker, we
affirm Hill’s conviction for the reasons stated in our prior
opinion, vacate Hill’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.
Hill contends that his sentence violates the Sixth
Amendment because the district court at sentencing held him
accountable for thirty-three grams of crack and enhanced his
sentence for obstruction of justice. Because Hill did not raise a
Sixth Amendment issue in the district court, we review for plain
error.1 See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir.
1
The Government asserts that Hill waived appellate review of
his Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence by failing to raise
it in his initial brief before this court. Although the Government
correctly states the general rule, see United States v. Al-Hamdi,
356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is a well settled rule
that contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening
brief are abandoned.”), we decline to enforce it in light of our
order directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
Booker. See United States v. Washington, 398 F.3d 306, 312 n.7
(4th Cir.) (stating that “[a]lthough appellate contentions not
raised in an opening brief are normally deemed to have been waived,
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2005). To demonstrate plain error, Hill must establish that error
occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial
rights. Id. at 547-48. If a defendant satisfies these
requirements, our “discretion is appropriately exercised only when
failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice, such as
when the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
manner in which the Sentencing Guidelines required courts to impose
sentencing enhancements based on facts found by the court by a
preponderance of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. 125 S.
Ct. at 746, 750 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court
remedied the constitutional violation by making the Guidelines
advisory through the removal of two statutory provisions that had
rendered them mandatory. Id. at 746 (Stevens, J., opinion of the
Court); id. at 756-67 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
the Booker principles apply in this proceeding because the
[Supreme] Court specifically mandated that we must apply [Booker]
. . . to all cases on direct review.”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2558 (2005);
United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 389 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Because [this] court requested . . . additional briefing, this
case is not governed by our rule that arguments not raised in the
appellant’s opening brief are typically deemed abandoned on
appeal.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1134 (2004).
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Here, the district court sentenced Hill under the
mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines by determining drug
quantity, applying an obstruction of justice enhancement, and
departing from criminal history category V to VI. These findings
yielded a Sentencing Guideline range of 168 to 210 months of
imprisonment, and the court sentenced Hill to a 188-month term of
imprisonment. Using only the amount of drugs found by the jury
(less than five grams of crack cocaine) without the enhancement for
obstruction of justice,2 Hill’s offense level would have been
twenty-four. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(8)
(2002). The resulting Guideline range would be 100 to 125 months
of imprisonment. USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). In light
of Booker and Hughes, we find that the district court’s plain error
in sentencing Hill based on facts found by the court affects his
substantial rights and warrants correction.3
Accordingly, we vacate Hill’s sentence and remand for
resentencing.4 We also affirm Hill’s conviction. We dispense with
2
We take no position on whether the district court’s upward
departure from criminal history category V to VI violates the Sixth
Amendment because, even assuming a criminal history category of VI,
Hill is entitled to be resentenced.
3
Just as we noted in Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of
course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the
law and procedure in effect at the time” of Hill’s sentencing.
4
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes
clear that a sentencing court must still “consult [the] Guidelines
and take them into account when sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767
(Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). On remand, the district court
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oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
should first determine the appropriate sentencing range under the
Guidelines, making all factual findings appropriate for that
determination. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider
this sentencing range along with the other factors described in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a
sentence. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. If that sentence falls outside
the Guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons for the
departure as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005). Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must be
“within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”
Id. at 547.
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