Barr v. County of Richland

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7002 VINCENT L. BARR, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus COUNTY OF RICHLAND; JOSEPH BOCHENEK, Director; CHARLES CLARK, Chief of Police; COLUMBIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees, and BARBARA SCOTT, Clerk of Court; BARNEY GIESE, Solicitor; JOHN WILKINS, Public Defender; ALVIN S. GLENN DETENTION CENTER, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-04-1419-2) Submitted: December 22, 2005 Decided: December 30, 2005 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Vincent L. Barr, Appellant Pro Se. William Henry Davidson, II, Andrew Frederick Lindemann, Robert David Garfield, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Robert Gordon Cooper, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). - 2 - PER CURIAM: Vincent L. Barr seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s judgment was entered on the docket on May 5, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest, on June 13, 2005. Because Barr failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we grant the Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED - 3 -