UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4485
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GREGORY A. HASTON, II,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-102)
Submitted: January 4, 2006 Decided: January 25, 2006
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charles T. Miller, Acting United States Attorney, John J. Frail,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Gregory A. Haston, II, pled guilty to one count of
attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Haston was sentenced to thirty-seven
months’ imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised
release. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Haston argues that the retroactive application
of the remedial holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), violates due process. He asserts that “[d]ue process, as
informed by ex post facto principles,” prevents a court from
retroactively exposing him to a greater sentence than that which
might have been imposed under the formerly mandatory sentencing
guidelines. We have throughly reviewed Haston’s claim and find it
to be without merit. See United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting ex post facto claim); United States v.
Jamison, 416 F.3d 538, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); United
States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 110-12 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); United
States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2005) (same);
United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1306-08 (11th Cir. 2005)
(same), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2005 WL 2493971 (U.S. Oct. 11,
2005) (No. 05-5467).
Haston also asserts that the sentence imposed by the
district court was unreasonable under this court’s decision in
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005), because
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the sentence was “greater than necessary to comply with the
purposes of sentencing.”
Haston’s thirty-seven-month sentence was not only within
the advisory guideline range, but also well below the statutory
maximum of twenty years. Furthermore, the sentence imposed by the
district court was reasonable as the court appropriately treated
the guidelines as advisory, calculated and considered the guideline
range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) factors.
Finally, Haston’s assertion that his sentence was greater than
necessary to satisfy the purposes discussed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(2) is purely speculative. Thus, we conclude there was no
error in Haston’s sentence.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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