UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4536
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RONILDO ALGERIA HASKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
District Judge. (CR-04-162)
Submitted: January 6, 2006 Decided: February 10, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ronildo Algeria Haskins appeals his conviction on one
count of possession with intent to distribute 53.6 grams of crack
cocaine, one count of possession with intent to distribute 310.6
grams of marijuana, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000),
and one count of possession of a firearm after having been
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), and the
240-month sentence imposed by the district court. We affirm.
On appeal, counsel filed an Anders1 brief in which he
states that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
suggests that the district court erred in denying Haskins’s motion
for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the jury’s verdict, and that Haskins’s sentence was
unreasonable in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005). In a pro se supplemental brief, Haskins essentially
repeats the arguments raised by counsel.
Haskins first argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. A jury’s verdict
must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the
record to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). In determining whether the evidence in the record is
1
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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substantial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, and inquire whether there is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do
not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume that the
jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the
government. United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.
1998). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on each count
of conviction.
Haskins also asserts that his sentence is unreasonable
because his offense level was enhanced for obstruction of justice
based upon his instruction to a witness to give false testimony
about where he resided and how much time he spent at her apartment.
Haskins argues that the enhancement was improper because
obstruction of justice was not alleged in the indictment or found
by the jury. “Consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in
Booker, a district court shall first calculate (after making the
appropriate findings of fact) the range prescribed by the
guidelines.” United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.
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2005). Because Haskins was sentenced post-Booker, the district
court first calculated his Guideline2 range.
The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice if “the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” USSG § 3C1.1.
The commentary to the obstruction Guidelines includes unlawfully
influencing a witness and suborning, or attempting to suborn,
perjury. USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4). Factual findings by the
district court at sentencing, including those necessary for the
imposition of an obstruction enhancement, are reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 2004).
We have reviewed the testimony in this case and conclude that the
enhancement for obstruction of justice was appropriately imposed.
After calculating the appropriate Guideline range, the
district court must then consider the range in conjunction with
other relevant factors under the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) and impose a sentence. If a court imposes a sentence
outside the Guideline range, the court must state its reasons for
doing so. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must be “within
the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Id. at
546-47 (citations omitted). Haskins’s convictions of possession
2
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) (2004).
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with intent to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon exposed him to a
statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
In this case the district court calculated the Guideline
range, but appropriately treated the Guidelines as advisory. The
court sentenced Haskins only after considering the sentencing
Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as instructed by Booker.
Because the court imposed a sentence within the applicable
Guideline range and that sentence is well within the statutory
maximum, we conclude that the sentence of 240 months of
imprisonment is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Haskins’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Haskins, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Haskins requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Haskins.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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