UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RONALD SAMUEL JACKSON, a/k/a Young,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. James C. Turk, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-93)
Submitted: January 4, 2006 Decided: February 7, 2006
Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Seguinot, THE HELEIN LAW GROUP, L.L.P., McLean, Virginia, for
Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, William F.
Gould, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Jackson appeals his jury conviction and sentence for
one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the
intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack),
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court sentenced
Jackson to 240 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jackson presses
several claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm
Jackson’s conviction and sentence.
Jackson first claims that the district court erroneously
allowed the government to strike the only African-American juror in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Great
deference is given to a district court’s determination of whether
a peremptory challenge was based on a discriminatory motive and the
court’s ruling is reviewed for clear error. Jones v. Plaster, 57
F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995). Generally, a Batson challenge
consists of three steps: (1) the defendant makes a prima facie
showing; (2) the government offers a race-neutral explanation; and
(3) the district court decides whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. United States v.
Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 812 (4th Cir. 2000). “Once a prosecutor
has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question
of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez
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v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion). “At
this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will
be deemed race neutral.” Id. at 360.
The government’s proffered explanation was that it struck the
juror in question because: (1) “she did not answer any questions
[during voir dire]”; (2) she told the clerk that she was “single,
but yet she [gave] a spouse’s occupation”; (3) she was “older”; and
(4) she did not appear to be “following what was going on.” (J.A.
115). The government’s explanation unquestionably satisfies the
second step. Indeed, the district court expressed similar
reservations concerning the struck juror when it commented that it
“wondered, too, a little bit, whether or not she followed the
questions or whatnot.” (J.A. 117).
Turning to the third step in the inquiry, we review only for
clear error the district court’s finding that Jackson failed to
carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Jones, 57
F.3d at 421. Jackson offered no meaningful evidence in support of
his conclusory allegations of racial motivation. Based on our
review of the record in this case, the district court did not
clearly err in denying Jackson’s Batson motion.
Jackson next claims that there is insufficient evidence in the
record to support his conspiracy conviction. The jury’s verdict in
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this case must be sustained if there is substantial evidence,
taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). “[S]ubstantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept
as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, this court does not review the credibility of the
witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved contradictions in
testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Romer, 148
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). “To prove a conspiracy under 21
U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove (1) an agreement between
two or more persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal
drug law, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3)
the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the
conspiracy.” United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384-85
(4th Cir. 2001).
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find the evidence
sufficient to support Jackson’s conspiracy conviction. Multiple
witnesses testified that Jackson participated in a conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute fifty or
more grams of crack. One of the witnesses testified concerning
Jackson’s role in a controlled buy that led to both of their
arrests. Moreover, a law enforcement officer testified that he
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witnessed the controlled buy and recovered money used in the
controlled buy from Jackson after his arrest. The record also
contains evidence demonstrating that Jackson disposed of an item
upon his arrest that contained a large amount of crack. This item
tested positive for crack and weighed over fifty grams.
Finally, relying on Section 4A1.3(b) of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), Jackson argues that his criminal
history, which included a prior drug felony conviction,
substantially over-represented the seriousness of his criminal
history and, therefore, the district court should have found his
criminal history category to be II instead of III. Any error in
this regard is harmless because Jackson was sentenced to the
statutory minimum sentence of twenty years pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A). See USSG § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required
minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be
the guideline sentence.”). Consequently, Jackson’s criminal
history category has no bearing on the appropriateness of his
sentence.*
*
On November 10, 2005, Jackson filed a motion for leave to
file a supplemental brief. On November 28, 2005, Jackson filed,
pro se, a series of materials which we construe as a motion for
leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. The court grants both
of these motions. After reviewing the motions, we conclude that
all of the arguments raised therein are without merit.
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For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Jackson’s conviction
and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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