UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4878
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SALLIE SHULTZ, a/k/a Sallie Schultz,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-03-188)
Submitted: February 3, 2006 Decided: February 23, 2006
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Miles Morgan, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charles T. Miller, Acting United States Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Sallie Shultz appeals the forty-six-month sentence
imposed by the district court after she pled guilty to aiding and
abetting retaliation against an informant, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1513(b), 2 (2000). Shultz asserts that this court should
reconsider the decision in United States v. Cross, 371 F.3d 176
(4th Cir. 2004), and that, in light of United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), her sentence is unreasonable. We
affirm.
Shultz contends that the district court erred by
determining her base offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2X3.1(a) (2004), because the court held her accountable
for relevant conduct relating to the underlying offense about which
she did not know or could not have reasonably known. In Cross, 371
F.3d at 182, we rejected this contention. Although Shultz urges us
to reconsider our holding in Cross, “a panel of this court cannot
overrule, explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior
panel of this court. Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting
en banc can do that.” Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d
264, 271-72 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Shultz also asserts on appeal that, in light of Booker,
her sentence is unreasonable. Although the Sentencing Guidelines
are no longer mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court
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“must consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.” 543 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (Breyer, J.,
opinion of the Court). The court should consider this sentencing
range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a sentence.
United States v. Clark, __ F.3d __, __, 2006 WL 60273, at *1 (4th
Cir. Jan. 12, 2006) (citing United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
546 (4th Cir. 2005)). The sentence must be “within the statutorily
prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47
(citations omitted).
In sentencing Shultz, the district court considered the
properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guideline range and the
factors in § 3553(a). Because the court sentenced Shultz within
the advisory Guideline range and within the ten-year statutory
maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b), we conclude that the sentence is
reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Shultz’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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