UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4555
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY RAYMOND WILINSKI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CR-
03-487)
Argued: October 28, 2005 Decided: March 31, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Lauren Elizabeth Case, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Gina Laurie Simms,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda,
Federal Public Defender, John Chamble, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Allen F. Loucks,
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Raymond Wilinski appeals a special condition of
supervised release. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
Wilinski is a former student of the University of Maryland
College Park (UMC). In July 2003, Wilinski began sending racially
abusive and vulgar electronic mail to employees at the university
because he believed that he and his family were under surveillance
by UMC. After he was banned from the campus, Wilinski mailed a
letter to his former attorney, stating that if UMC did not stop
harassing him, he might resort to violence by going on a shooting
spree at UMC.
Wilinski was arrested on October 17, 2003, and a search of his
home yielded 32 firearms. At the time of his arrest, Wilinski
stated that he should not be released from jail because the first
thing he would do would be to seek revenge against UMC and that
“Randy Weaver [would] pale in comparison.” J.A. 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Wilinski was detained pending trial and
committed for mental health treatment. On June 16, 2004, Wilinski
pleaded guilty to communicating threats by mail, see 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 876(c) (West Supp. 2005). The district court sentenced him to a
time-served sentence of 273 days imprisonment, plus three years of
supervised release. The district court imposed a special condition
2
prohibiting Wilinski from filing any lawsuits or legal proceedings
against UMC or its personnel without first receiving the permission
of his mental health professional. Wilinski argues that this
condition violates his right of access to the courts, is not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest, and
adversely interferes with the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
II.
District courts enjoy “broad latitude” in imposing special
conditions of supervised release. United States v. Dotson, 324
F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003); see id. at 259 (stating that special
conditions of supervised release are reviewed for abuse of
discretion).* However, in imposing a special condition of
supervised release, the district court must ensure that the
condition is “reasonably related” to the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the need to provide adequate deterrence; the protection
of the public from further crimes; and the need to provide the
defendant with training, medical care, or treatment. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(d)(1) (West 2000) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D) (West 2000)). Additionally, the
*
Although the conditions of supervised release are analyzed
under an abuse of discretion standard, reviewing courts will
“carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.” United
States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3
district court must ensure that the condition “involves no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the
purposes set forth in [18 U.S.C.A. §] 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and
(a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(d)(2) (West 2000). And, the
condition must be “consistent with any pertinent policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§]
994(a).” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3853(d)(3) (West 2000).
Although the right of access to the courts is fundamental, see
Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 1996), a district
court may impose a condition of supervised release that restricts
a defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights when the condition
is “directly related to advancing the [defendant’s] rehabilitation
and to protecting the public from recidivism.” United States v.
Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 1997). That is the case here.
It is undisputed that Wilinski suffers from a mental illness
that, among other symptoms, causes him to believe that UMC has him
under surveillance. The special condition limits only Wilinski’s
ability to file lawsuits against UMC or its personnel. Because
Wilinski is not otherwise barred from filing any lawsuits, the
condition is tailored to his circumstances. See id. We also
conclude that the condition promotes Wilinski’s recovery and
protects the public from his potential recidivism. Given
Wilinski’s mental illness, his therapist is in the best position to
know whether or not a lawsuit against UMC or its staff will further
4
his recovery. See United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1204
(9th Cir. 1998) (affirming special condition that defendant comply
with recommendations of his therapist on the basis that the
treating therapist was best qualified to know what lifestyle
restrictions were necessary to enhance treatment and reduce the
likelihood of re-offending). Importantly, should his therapist
deny permission to file an action, Wilinski may apply to the
district court seeking permission to do so.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the special
condition of supervised release. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
5