UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5036
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TERRY LAMONT MUMFORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (CR-05-125; CR-05-126)
Submitted: March 30, 2006 Decided: April 6, 2006
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Kearns
Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Terry Lamont Mumford appeals the two concurrent 180-month
imprisonment sentences imposed after he pled guilty to two
separately-indicted counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000). The district court concluded that Mumford
qualified for sentencing as a career offender pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2004), and sentenced him
under an advisory sentencing regime, after considering the
applicable sentencing range and the factors under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), to a sentence within the
applicable guideline range. On appeal, Mumford asserts that his
sentence violates the Supreme Court’s holdings in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), because
his guideline sentencing range was determined based upon facts that
were not alleged in the indictment or admitted by him. However,
Mumford concedes that his argument is against current Fourth
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.
Contrary to Mumford’s position, his sentence was not
violative of Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker. A district court may
enhance a sentence based on the “fact of” a prior conviction
without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment, where the facts
necessary to support the enhancement are “inherent” in the
conviction rather than being “extraneous” to it. See United States
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v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282, 283-86 (4th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, U.S. , 2006 WL 521274 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) (No. 05-
7266); United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir.)
(holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
was not violated by district court’s reliance on prior convictions
for purposes of sentencing under Armed Career Criminal Act), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 640 (2005). Moreover, on appeal, Mumford does
not challenge any factual findings regarding the prior convictions,
and he does not dispute the factual basis for the district court’s
conclusion that he was a career offender. Hence, his assertion
that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm Mumford’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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