UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILBUR EDDIS CLINE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(CR-04-1066)
Submitted: March 30, 2006 Decided: April 6, 2006
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hervery B. O. Young, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alan Lance Crick, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Wilbur Eddis Cline appeals his conviction and 180-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute more than five hundred grams
of cocaine and more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Cline’s counsel filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising several
issues but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious
issues for appeal. Cline was informed of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
Counsel questions whether the district court complied
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Cline’s guilty plea. Because
Cline did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty
plea, we review his challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11
hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,
525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the transcript of the Rule 11
hearing leads us to conclude that the district court fully complied
with the requirements of Rule 11. We therefore find no plain error
in the court’s acceptance of Cline’s guilty plea.
Next, counsel raises as potential issues whether the
district court properly classified Cline as a career offender
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2004), and
whether, in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
such classification violates the Sixth Amendment. Cline did not
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object in the district court; thus, we review for plain error.
United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir.) (stating
standard of review), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 297 (2005). We
conclude that the district court properly designated Cline as a
career offender. See id. (discussing elements of USSG § 4B1.1(a)).
We also find that Cline’s Sixth Amendment argument is foreclosed by
our decision in United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 521-23 (4th
Cir. 2005).
Counsel also suggests that the district court erred in
sentencing Cline to a 180-month sentence. Our review of the record
convinces us that the district court properly calculated the
advisory sentencing guideline range, which included a downward
departure under USSG § 5K1.1, p.s., based upon Cline’s substantial
assistance, and that the sentence is reasonable. See United
States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discussing process in which district courts must engage to
sentence defendants post-Booker); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d
449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentence imposed within the properly
calculated Guidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally, with regard to Cline’s suggestion that counsel
provided ineffective assistance, we “may address [such claims] on
direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively
appears from the record.” United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d
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233, 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 74 U.S.L.W. 3474
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-8667). Because counsel’s
ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear from the face of the
record, we decline to review this claim on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm Cline’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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