UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4346
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO CARDELL BOYCE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-4347
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEMITRIUS COLEMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CR-04-482-4)
Submitted: March 29, 2006 Decided: April 19, 2006
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kathy Price Elmore, ORR, ELMORE & ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South
Carolina; D. Craig Brown, LAW OFFICE OF D. CRAIG BROWN, P.C.,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellants. Rose Mary Parham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Antonio Cardell Boyce and Demitrius Coleman appeal the
district court’s judgment entered pursuant to their guilty pleas
for using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2 (2000). Boyce and
Coleman’s attorneys have filed a joint brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. The Appellants have been notified
of their right to file pro se supplemental briefs but have not done
so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound
by the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. See United
States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). However, in
determining a sentence post-Booker, sentencing courts are still
required to calculate and consider the guideline range prescribed
thereby as well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000). Id. As stated in Hughes, this court will affirm a post-
Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and within the statutorily
prescribed range. Id. at 546-47.
Boyce and Coleman claim that the district court erred by
not calculating their sentencing guideline range. They each pled
guilty to two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime
of violence; one count required a statutory minimum sentence of
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seven years, and the other required a consecutive statutory minimum
of twenty-five years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The
district court did not calculate a sentencing guideline range and
instead selected the mandatory minimum sentence. Coleman
accordingly received a sentence of thirty-two years’ imprisonment.
As to Boyce, the district court granted the Government’s downward
departure motion for substantial assistance and sentenced him to
26.5 years’ imprisonment.
The district court erred when it did not calculate the
sentencing guideline range. See United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006) (The district court “must correctly
determine . . . the applicable guideline range.”). However, Boyce
and Coleman suffered no prejudice because they received the
statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Robinson, 404
F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we find no reversible
error.
The Appellants also claim they should have received an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, but because the
district court sentenced them to the statutory minimum it could not
depart below that statutory minimum except upon motion by the
Government on the basis of substantial assistance. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) (2000); Robinson, 404 F.3d at 862.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
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Boyce and Coleman’s sentences and convictions. This court requires
that counsel inform their clients, in writing, of their right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the clients request that a petition be filed, but counsel
believe that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client(s). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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