UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2109
JERRY TRULL, Individually and as
representative of a class of all persons
similarly situated; FLOYD SUTTON, Individually
and as representative of a class of all
persons similarly situated; EARL JOHNSON,
Individually and as representative of a class
of all persons similarly situated; JOYCE
RIGGS, Individually and as representative of a
class of all persons similarly situated; DON
HENSON, Individually and as representative of
a class of all persons similarly situated;
RODERICK ROGERS, Individually and as
representative of a class of all persons
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
DAYCO PRODUCTS, LLC; MARK IV INDUSTRIES,
INCORPORATED; DAYCO PRODUCTS, INCORPORATED
GROUP MEDICAL PLAN; MARK IV INDUSTRIES,
INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES GROUP WELFARE
BENEFIT PROGRAM,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 05-1591
JERRY TRULL, Individually and as
representative of a class of all persons
similarly situated; FLOYD SUTTON, Individually
and as representative of a class of all
persons similarly situated; EARL JOHNSON,
Individually and as representative of a class
of all persons similarly situated; JOYCE
RIGGS, Individually and as representative of a
class of all persons similarly situated; DON
HENSON, Individually and as representative of
a class of all persons similarly situated;
RODERICK ROGERS, Individually and as
representative of a class of all persons
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
DAYCO PRODUCTS, LLC; MARK IV INDUSTRIES,
INCORPORATED; DAYCO PRODUCTS, INCORPORATED
GROUP MEDICAL PLAN; MARK IV INDUSTRIES,
INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES GROUP WELFARE
BENEFIT PROGRAM,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CA-02-243-1)
Argued: March 16, 2006 Decided: April 28, 2006
Before WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Joseph J. Vogan, VARNUM, RIDDERING, SCHMIDT & HOWLETT,
L.L.P., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants. Julia Penny Clark,
BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: John W. Allen, Anthony R. Comden, Elizabeth Wells Skaggs,
VARNUM, RIDDERING, SCHMIDT & HOWLETT, L.L.P., Grand Rapids,
Michigan, for Appellants. Robert Alexander, Maryann Parker,
BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, the defendants challenge two
injunctions barring their efforts at collecting health insurance
premiums from members of the plaintiff class. The plaintiffs are
retirees who worked at defendant Dayco Products, LLC’s (“Dayco”)
now-closed plant in Waynesville, North Carolina. They brought this
class action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West 1998), and section 502(a)(1)
and (3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1), (3) (West 1999), against Dayco and
related entities (collectively, “Defendants”) to enforce vested
rights to lifetime medical insurance created by a series of
collective bargaining agreements. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
I.
The first injunction barred Defendants from seeking payment of
insurance premiums from a subclass of plaintiffs known as Subclass
A, generally consisting of employees who retired under agreements
prior to 1995 (the “Subclass A Injunction”). The district court
entered the Subclass A Injunction based on a jury’s determination
that the Subclass A plaintiffs were entitled to vested, lifetime
medical benefits at no cost for health insurance premiums and at
the level of benefits in existence at the dates of retirement.
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We reject Defendants’ argument that the injunction was
improper because the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. Because
the LMRA and ERISA do not contain an express statute of limitations
governing plaintiffs’ claims, we apply the most analogous
limitations period of the forum state’s law. See Dameron v. Sinai
Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987). The
plaintiffs commenced their action in the Southern District of Ohio,
where Dayco maintained its headquarters, making the Ohio statute of
limitations for breach of contract the most analogous statute of
limitations under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.06;
see also Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190,
194-95 (6th Cir. 1992). The transfer to the Western District of
North Carolina “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses,”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1993), is irrelevant to
this analysis, since the goal of § 1404(a) is to “accomplish[] ‘but
a change of courtrooms.’” See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors,
8 F.3d 1121, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “[w]hen the law
of the United States is geographically non-uniform, a transferee
court should use the rule of the transferor forum”) (quoting Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964)).
We also disagree with Defendants’ contention that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the
Subclass A plaintiffs had a vested entitlement to lifetime
benefits. In Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
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1989), a case involving claims under the LMRA and ERISA, we
explained:
In determining whether an employer’s obligation to
provide benefits to its retirees or their surviving
spouses continues beyond the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, we look to the parties’ intent as
expressed in their agreement. While the question
therefore is primarily one of contract interpretation,
collective bargaining agreements are not interpreted
under traditional rules of contract but under a federal
common law of labor policy. Therefore, in order to
interpret such an agreement it is necessary to consider
the scope of other related collective bargaining
agreements, as well as the practice, usage and custom
pertaining to all such agreements. Of course, as with
any contract interpretation, we begin by looking at the
language of the agreement for any clear manifestation of
the parties’ intent. The intended meaning of even the
most explicit language can, of course, only be understood
in light of the context which gave rise to its inclusion.
Id. at 62 (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Applying this framework, we find no reversible error in the
district court’s decision that, because the agreements were
ambiguous, a jury should decide whether the parties intended to
create vested, lifetime medical benefits. The various agreements
are susceptible to competing interpretations as to whether benefits
vested. In fact, in the agreement implemented in connection with
the closing of the Waynesville plant, the union and employees made
one exception to their waiver of claims against the company:
The only exception to this provision shall be the
company’s failure to honor . . . any applicable benefit
plan that continues past the contract termination. . . .
[N]othing in this agreement is intended to waive, modify
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or limit any retiree’s right to a pension or medical
insurance, nor is it intended to waive, modify or limit
such rights for any employee who is eligible to retire
pursuant to the terms of the amended agreement.
J.A. 984 (No. 04-2109) (emphasis added). This exception strongly
suggests that the parties contemplated continuing medical benefits.
Defendants’ reliance on Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d
851 (4th Cir. 1994), is misplaced. Gable involved a claim arising
only under ERISA for benefits the employer unilaterally provided to
its employees, where we explained that an employer’s waiver of “its
statutory right to modify or terminate benefits . . . by
voluntarily undertaking an obligation to provide vested,
unalterable benefits” should be “clear and express.” Id. at 855
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted).
Gable does not apply, because the district court entered the
Subclass A Injunction based on a breach of the LMRA, not ERISA, and
Defendants offered the benefits in the context of collectively
bargained agreements, not as a “voluntar[y] undertaking.” Id.
Having determined that the issue was properly sent to the jury
and having considered the evidence in the record, we conclude that
there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision that
the parties intended to create vested, lifetime benefits.
II.
The second injunction relates to a subclass of plaintiffs
known as Subclass B, generally consisting of employees who retired
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under a 1995 agreement (the “Subclass B Injunction”). The jury
found that the Subclass B plaintiffs were entitled to vested,
lifetime medical benefits at the level of benefits in existence at
the dates of retirement, but that they must pay any amounts
exceeding certain “annual insurance premium caps” to maintain their
coverage. By agreement of the parties, the Subclass B plaintiffs
deferred payments of the amounts exceeding the caps during the
pendency of the litigation.
The district court entered the Subclass B Injunction to
prevent Defendants from seeking repayment of the deferred amounts
until a special master worked out reasonable repayment schedules
for the plaintiffs. The district court entered the Subclass B
Injunction under the authority of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1651(a) (West 1994), which permits federal courts to “issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
Defendants argue that the district court inappropriately used
the All Writs Act to circumvent the requirements for preliminary
injunctions contained in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. We disagree. The district court was quite clear that
there was “nothing preliminary” about its injunction and that it
was acting to “safeguard the sanctity of previous orders,
decisions, the preliminary judgment and the jury verdict.” J.A.
326 (No. 05-1591) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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The district court was concerned that Defendants’ efforts
might frustrate plaintiffs’ entitlement to vested, lifetime medical
benefits. The district court also acknowledged that the sums
Defendants sought to collect might be offset by a recovery on
plaintiffs’ still-pending, non-jury ERISA count. J.A. 342 (No. 05-
1591) (“It is, therefore, well within the Court’s prerogative to
forestall collection now of sums which may only have to be
reimbursed.”). We conclude that the district court acted well
within its authority and complied with the relevant portions of
Rule 65. See In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealerships
Relations Litig., 315 F.3d 417, 437 (4th Cir. 2003); Scardelletti
v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195, 211-13 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other
grounds, 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
Likewise, we reject Defendants’ assertion that the district
court could not appoint a special master without their consent.
Defendants’ reliance on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is misguided, as the district court appointed the special
master based on its inherent authority to fashion appropriate post-
verdict relief. See, e.g., Cronin v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 364,
377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]here is considerable room for appointing
special masters when the purpose of the master is to enforce a
judicial decree.”); United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974,
984 (D. Conn. 1996) (noting, in the context of a consent decree,
that “beyond the provisions of [Rule 53] . . . , a federal district
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court has the inherent power to supply itself with [a special
master] for the administration of justice when deemed by it
essential”) (second alteration in original; citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Even had Rule 53 applied, the district court would not have
needed the parties’ consent to appoint a master. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 53(a)(1)(C) (allowing for special master without consent of
parties to handle post-trial matters that cannot be addressed
effectively and timely by an available district judge).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
district court in No. 04-2109 and No. 05-1591. We note that the
case is still pending in district court and express no opinion on
the merits of any remaining issues.
AFFIRMED
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