UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4512
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAKARAI JORDAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.
(CR-04-36-BEL)
Submitted: February 28, 2006 Decided: May 12, 2006
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert W. Biddle, NATHANS & BIDDLE, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Richard
C. Kay, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Dakarai Jordan appeals his jury conviction for conspiracy
to import ecstasy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2000). We
affirm.
Jordan contends the trial court erred in admitting his
post arrest confession because it was involuntary. We review the
district court’s factual findings underlying a motion to suppress
for clear error and the district court’s legal determinations de
novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United
States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004). When a
suppression motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
“The test for determining whether a statement is
voluntary under the Due Process Clause is whether the confession
was extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the
exertion of any improper influence.” United States v. Braxton, 112
F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The mere existence of coercive police activity does not render a
confession involuntary. To find a confession involuntary, the
police officers’ conduct must be such that the defendant’s will is
“‘overborne’ or his ‘capacity for self-determination is critically
impaired.’” Id. at 780 (citation omitted). “[C]ourts must
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consider ‘the totality of the circumstances, including the
characteristics of the defendant, the setting of the interview, and
the details of the interrogation.’” Id. at 781 (citation omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
we conclude that the district court properly admitted Jordan’s post
arrest statements.
Jordan also contends that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of transactions with two drug customers known as
“D” and “G.” Jordan argues that since these transactions were
uncharged, they were erroneously admitted at trial as bad acts
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
The district court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to
substantial deference and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 342
(4th Cir. 2003). A district court will not be found to have abused
its discretion unless its decision to admit evidence under Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) was arbitrary or irrational. United States v. Haney,
914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990).
Rule 404(b) only applies to acts extrinsic to the crime
charged. When testimony is admitted as to acts intrinsic to the
crime charged and is not admitted solely to demonstrate bad
character, it is admissible. United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88
(4th Cir. 1996). Acts are intrinsic when they are “inextricably
intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or
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the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th
Cir. 1993)). Evidence of uncharged conduct is not considered
“other crimes” for Rule 404(b) purposes if it “arose out of the
same . . . series of transactions as the charged offense . . . or
if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime [on] trial.”
United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994)
(quotation omitted). We conclude that the evidence was properly
admitted as acts intrinsic to the charged crime of conspiracy to
import ecstasy.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Jordan’s jury
conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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