UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1866
MESFIN KETEMA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MIDWEST STAMPING, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
TERRY JUDY; TEDD BALDWIN; CYNTHIA THOMPSON;
KIMDRA BELSER,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (CA-02-502-JFA)
Submitted: April 19, 2006 Decided: May 12, 2006
Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Mesfin Ketema, Appellant Pro Se. Derwood Lorraine Aydlette, III,
Christina Marie Summer, GIGNILLIAT, SAVITZ & BETTIS, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Mesfin Ketema appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on his federal employment discrimination claims
and dismissal without prejudice of his state breach of contract,
libel, and slander claims. On appeal, Ketema, who is black and of
Ethiopian descent, also asserts that the district court failed to
consider his claim that he was paid less than comparable white
managers. We have reviewed the voluminous record and the arguments
of the parties, and we affirm the dismissal of Ketema’s federal
claims for the reasons stated by the district court. See Ketema v.
Midwest Stamping, No. CA-02-502-JFA (D.S.C., filed July 26, 2005,
entered July 27, 2005). In addition, we conclude that Ketema’s
purported evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case
of disparate treatment with regard to pay, because Ketema has
failed to show that any of his proposed comparators were similarly
situated.
Ketema also challenges the dismissal without prejudice of
his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). Once the
district court dismissed the federal claims against Defendants, the
court had the authority to retain jurisdiction over the state law
claims that were closely related to the original claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). However, the district court also had the discretion to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims outside
its original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We have
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recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining
whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all
federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). In exercising that discretion, the
district court should consider “convenience and fairness to the
parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy,
comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Semple v. City of
Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 714 (4th Cir. 1999). In addition, the
dismissal may be an abuse of discretion where the state statute of
limitations expired prior to dismissal of the anchor federal claim.
Edwards v. Okaloosa County, 5 F.3d 1431, 1433-35 (11th Cir. 1993);*
Joiner v. Diamond M Drilling Co, 677 F.2d 1035, 1043 (5th Cir.
1982).
Here, the litigants allege that, at the present time,
there is complete diversity between the parties. Thus, any suit
filed in state court would be removable and likely returned to the
same district court. In addition, the lawsuit was filed over four
years ago, discovery is complete, and refiling the suit would cause
all parties to incur additional costs. Finally, Ketema’s action
would now be time-barred. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(1) (2003)
(three year statute of limitations for contract claims); S.C. Code
*
Edwards notes that “district courts commonly require the
defendants to file a waiver of the statute of limitations defense
as a condition of dismissal.” 5 F.3d at 1435 n.3. No waiver was
filed in this case.
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Ann. § 15-3-550(1) (2003) (two year statute of limitations for
libel and slander claims).
We find that it would be a waste of judicial resources to
require Ketema to refile a suit that has been pending for a lengthy
period of time and has progressed through the discovery stage. In
addition, any refiling would be fruitless, as the statute of
limitations has run, and thus, Ketema would be prejudiced by
dismissal. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Ketema’s state law claims.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment on Ketema’s federal claims, vacate the dismissal of his
state claims, and remand for further proceedings. We deny Ketema’s
motion for en banc review. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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