UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4719
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE EMERY ROY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-05-20)
Submitted: March 29, 2006 Decided: May 11, 2006
Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, John S. Davis,
Sara E. Flannery, Assistant United States Attorneys, Christopher M.
Kelly, Third-Year Law Student, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Emery Roy pled guilty to Count One of a
superseding indictment that charged him with operating a motor
vehicle after having been adjudicated a habitual offender in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000), assimilating Va. Code Ann.
§ 46.2-357 (West 2006). He was sentenced to the statutory maximum
term of five years imprisonment. Roy appeals his sentence, arguing
that the court erred in giving him the maximum sentence without
considering the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000
& Supp. 2005),* or the need to avoid disparity in sentencing. We
affirm.
*
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) provides in part that in determining
the sentence the court shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; [and]
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1), (2).
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Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we review sentences for
reasonableness. Roy contends that the district court failed to
explain adequately its reasons for imposing the maximum statutory
sentence. He argues that it was error for the district court not
to address the mitigating evidence about his offense that he
presented to the court, and not to address the principles of
proportionality and avoidance of disparity in sentencing. However,
this court has held that a sentencing court is presumed to have
considered the factors set out in § 3553(a) unless the record
indicates otherwise, and that it need not specifically address each
factor. United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir.
2000) (dealing with denial of motion to reduce sentence); see also
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that “nothing in Booker requires the district court to
state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.”).
We have reviewed the court’s statement of its reasons for imposing
the maximum sentence and conclude that it adequately considered the
§ 3553(a) factors.
We find no merit in Roy’s claim that his sentence is
unreasonable, disparate, or greater than necessary to achieve the
purposes of sentencing because Virginia has “eliminated
adjudication of habitual offenders.” The 1999 change to the Va.
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Code altered, but did not eliminate, Virginia’s policy of
prosecuting those who commit serious traffic violations, and the
legislation provided saving provisions for the penalties to be
imposed on those previously convicted as habitual offenders for
having accumulated such violations.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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