UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2055
WILLIAM NATHAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT TWO,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CA-02-2681-3)
Submitted: May 10, 2006 Decided: May 18, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Herbert E. Buhl, III, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Kenneth L. Childs, Thomas K. Barlow, CHILDS & HALLIGAN, P.A.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff William Nathan appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to his former employer, defendant Richland County
School District 2, in his Title VII race discrimination suit. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Plaintiff is an African American whom the district hired on a
provisional basis in 1996 to work as an auto mechanics teacher in
one of its high schools. The terms of his contract, South Carolina
law, and the regulations of the South Carolina Board of Education
required that within five years he pass the state’s Education
Entrance Examination, a prerequisite to obtaining a certificate
that would allow him to continue teaching. Despite several
attempts, plaintiff did not pass the exam, and the district
terminated his employment in 2001 when his provisional teaching
certificate expired.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this suit, in which he claims
that he was the victim of disparate treatment and a hostile work
environment. His first claim alleges that because of his race,
district officials did not provide him with additional time and aid
to pass the exam or transfer him to a satisfactory position that
did not require a permanent teaching certificate. His second claim
alleges that during his tenure, co-workers committed various acts
of harassment, including making disparaging comments and excluding
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plaintiff from professional and social opportunities. Following
discovery, the district moved for summary judgment. In a
comprehensive written report, the magistrate judge recommended that
the motion be granted. The district court accepted this
recommendation and entered judgment in favor of the district.
We agree that plaintiff has failed to present evidence that
would permit a reasonable jury to find that he was the victim of
illegal race discrimination, and we therefore affirm. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). With respect
to plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim, his attempt to make out
a prima facie case under the framework specified in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), falls short
because he has not shown that “he was treated worse than similarly
situated employees of other races.” Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d
338, 345 (4th Cir. 2005). As the magistrate judge explained in
detail, plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that there
were any non-African Americans whose situations were materially
similar to his and who were treated more favorably.
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim likewise fails.
Even if plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment, he has not
presented sufficient evidence regarding the other elements
necessary to prevail at trial. We concur in the magistrate judge’s
well-reasoned determination that plaintiff has not shown that “the
harassment was based on his race,” that it “was sufficiently severe
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or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive atmosphere,” or that “there is some basis for imposing
liability on the employer” for its employees’ actions. Causey v.
Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before us and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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