UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4480
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GARDELL ERVIN CHRISTIAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (CR-03-325)
Submitted: May 15, 2006 Decided: June 6, 2006
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William B. Cummings, WILLIAM B. CUMMINGS, P.C., Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Michael James Elston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Jonathan Leo Fahey, Matthew Josef Bester, Joseph
Kevin Wheatly, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Gardell Ervin Christian appeals the district court’s
order sentencing him to 78 months’ imprisonment following his
guilty plea to a single count of conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000).
Christian’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he finds no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the validity of
Christian’s plea agreement. Christian’s counsel also questions
whether Christian pled guilty to the charge that he thought he was
pleading guilty to, and whether the sentence was reasonable.
Christian filed a pro se supplemental brief, wherein he challenged
the validity of his plea agreement, alleged errors in his arrest
and indictment, and claimed that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Government did not file an answering
brief. We have reviewed the record and, finding no reversible
error, affirm Christian’s conviction and sentence.
A guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt, and it
forecloses most challenges to the resulting conviction. A
defendant may, however, challenge the knowing and voluntary nature
of his plea, and may challenge the jurisdictional basis for the
conviction. See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2
(1975).
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Christian seeks to challenge the voluntariness of his
guilty plea. At the time of his plea hearing, Christian was forty-
three and had managed his own remodeling business. He indicated
that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and
affirmed that he had discussed the agreement with his counsel. The
district court also specifically discussed the charges and factual
basis for the charges, and Christian indicated that he understood.
When Christian expressed some ambivalence about his guilty plea,
the court offered him the opportunity to withdraw the plea, but
Christian did not avail himself of this opportunity. We find
Christian’s guilty plea to have been made knowingly and
voluntarily, and reject his argument that he thought he was
pleading guilty to a different count of the indictment.
Christian’s challenges to his arrest and indictment are
precluded by his guilty plea, which acts as a waiver of all
nonjurisdictional defects in the indictment. Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489,
490 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding guilty plea constitutes a waiver of
nonjurisdictional defects).
Christian raises several challenges to his counsel’s
performance. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
establishes ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson,
195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Instead, to allow for adequate
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development of the record, a defendant generally must bring his
ineffective assistance claims in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2000). United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).
An exception exists where the record conclusively shows ineffective
assistance. Id. Here, the record on its face does not
conclusively demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
Christian’s counsel has questioned whether the sentence
of seventy-eight months’ imprisonment was reasonable in light of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). We have stated
that a sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range
and . . . reasonable.” United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-
47 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). A sentence imposed
within a correctly calculated guideline range is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d at 449, 457 (4th Cir.
2006).
A reasonable sentence is “selected pursuant to a reasoned
process in accordance with the law, in which the court [does] not
give excessive weight to any relevant factor, and which [effects]
a fair and just result in light of the relevant facts and law.”
Green, 436 F.3d at 457. Here, the district court discussed several
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000), including the type of
crime, the need for deterrence, the risk of recidivism and
Christian’s age and circumstances. The record does not indicate
that the district court gave excessive weight to any one factor.
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Christian was also sentenced at the bottom end of a properly-
calculated advisory guideline range. Accordingly, because the
sentence was within the advisory guideline range and was determined
according to a reasoned process in accordance with the law, we find
the sentence to be reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Christian’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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