Vacated by Supreme Court, January 7, 2008
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5230
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TYNISA DOVON RANDOLPH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Chief
District Judge. (CR-05-20)
Submitted: May 26, 2006 Decided: June 14, 2006
Before WILLIAMS, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas E. Johnston, United States
Attorney, David E. Godwin, Assistant United States Attorney,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Tynisa Dovon Randolph pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), (b)(1)(C) (2000). She received a 121-month sentence. On
appeal, she argues that the district court erred in not giving her
a two-level reduction for her role as a “minor participant,” and in
ruling that it lacked the authority to use a ratio other than the
100:1 ratio established by Congress in calculating the advisory
guideline range for a cocaine base offense. We affirm.
Randolph first argues that the court erred in denying her
a reduction based on her role as a “minor participant” pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2(b) (2004). The standard
of review for factual determinations, such as whether the
appellant’s conduct warrants a minor-role sentencing reduction, is
clear error. United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 218 (4th
Cir. 1989). A defendant who is only a “minor participant” in a
criminal activity may have his offense level reduced by two levels.
USSG § 3B1.2(b). This applies to a defendant “who is less culpable
than most other participants, but whose role could not be described
as minimal.” USSG § 3B1.2(b), comment. (n.5). We find that the
district court’s refusal to grant Randolph a two-level reduction
for being a “minor participant” was not clear error.
Randolph also claims that the court erred in ruling that
it lacked authority to use a ratio other than the 100:1 ratio
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established by Congress in calculating the advisory guideline range
for a cocaine base offense. Randolph’s argument is foreclosed by
Circuit precedent. See United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633-34
(4th Cir. 2006) (holding that, after United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court cannot vary from advisory
sentencing range by substituting its own crack cocaine/powder
cocaine ratio for the 100-to-1 ratio established by Congress);
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(upholding validity of 100-to-1 sentencing disparity).
Accordingly, we affirm Randolph’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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