UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5071
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TERRANCE J. ADAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (CR-03-285-HEH)
Submitted: May 19, 2006 Decided: June 14, 2006
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Peter S. Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Terrance J. Adams was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000) and sentenced to 120 months in prison and three years of
supervised release. On appeal, we affirmed Adams’s conviction,
vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing in accordance
with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On remand, the
district court sentenced Adams to 115 months in prison and three
years of supervised release. Adams contends the district court
erred by applying a four-level enhancement for use of the firearm
in connection with another felony offense and that his sentence was
unreasonable. We affirm.
In the presentence report, the probation officer applied
a base offense level of twenty for possession of the firearm after
having been convicted of a controlled substance offense under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2K2.1(a)(4) (2003); added
four levels for use of the firearm in connection with another
felony offense under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5); added two levels for
obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1; and computed a criminal
history category IV. With his offense level of twenty-six, Adams’s
advisory guideline range was 92 to 115 months in prison. However,
the probation officer noted the district court might want to
consider an upward departure under USSG § 4A1.3, because a number
of Adams’s prior convictions were not assigned criminal history
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points even though they resulted from violent behavior or were
drug-related.
The Government moved for an upward departure based on the
inadequacy of the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) in
reflecting Adams’s conduct and his under-represented criminal
history. Adams objected to the four-level enhancement and opposed
the upward departure motion. The district court found that Adams
used the firearm he was convicted of possessing to commit a
felonious assault on Alfred Harris and overruled Adams’s objection.
Adams contended the guidelines adequately took his criminal history
into account, and a 92 to 115 month guideline range was sufficient.
The district court found Adams’s criminal history category
substantially under-represented the seriousness of his criminal
history and likelihood of repeated criminal conduct and granted an
upward departure to category V, resulting in an advisory guideline
range of 110 to 135 months.
While the Government argued a sentence at the statutory
maximum of 120 months was appropriate, Adams requested a sentence
at the low end of the guidelines range based on progress he made in
rehabilitation since his first sentencing hearing. The district
court explained that based on Adams’s persistent criminal conduct,
an appropriate sentence would be “near the top” of the sentencing
range. However, the court gave Adams some credit for his improved
attitude and sentenced him to 115 months in prison.
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While Adams concedes he possessed the firearm and
assaulted Harris, he contends the district court erred in finding
he used the firearm to facilitate the assault and in enhancing his
sentence four levels. We disagree.
We review a district court’s factual findings at
sentencing for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989).
The enhancement is appropriate when “the defendant used or
possessed” the firearm “in connection with another felony offense.”
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5). A weapon is used or possessed in connection
with another offense if the weapon facilitates or has a tendency to
facilitate the other offense. United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d
404, 411 (4th Cir. 2003).
Harris testified that Adams hit him in the head with a
hard object; the blow caused him to fall down; and after he fell,
he heard a “boom.” One or more officers testified they heard a
gunshot; they observed Harris bleeding from a laceration to his
head; Harris showed them a bullet hole in the floor of his doorway;
they observed Adams alone in the car that was seen leaving the
scene of the wounding; and when the car was stopped, the firearm
was discovered with one spent round. Adams testified he also heard
a gunshot, but he did not fire the gun. Instead, he claimed he hit
Harris with a CD. Based upon the evidence presented, we conclude
the district court did not err in finding Harris used the firearm
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to assault Harris or in concluding that the firearm facilitated the
assault.
Adams contends his sentence was unreasonable because the
district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for his
sentence; failed to consider all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2000) “in a specific, particularized, and individualized
manner”; and imposed a sentence that was far greater than necessary
to accomplish sentencing goals. We conclude Adams’s sentence was
reasonable.
Because Adams’s sentence of 115 months was within his
original advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months, it is
presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d
449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 2006 WL 1057741
(U.S. May 22, 2006) (No. 05-10474). While a district court must
consider the various factors in § 3553(a) and explain its sentence,
it need not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection”
or “explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
“[A] district court’s explanation should provide some
indication (1) that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors with
respect to the particular defendant; and (2) that it has also
considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both
parties about sentencing.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). “[I]n determining whether there has
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been an adequate explanation, we do not evaluate a court’s
sentencing statements in a vacuum”; and “[t]he context surrounding
a district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content for
us to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and whether it did so properly.” Id.
In sentencing Adams, the district court stated it
considered both the factors under § 3553(a) and Adams’s change in
attitude since the prior sentencing hearing. Based on his
extensive criminal history, the court determined a reasonable
sentence would still be “near the top” of the sentencing range but
accorded him a reduction based on his rehabilitative efforts.
Moreover, the § 3553(a) factors clearly support the reasonableness
of Adams’s sentence. The sentence imposed not only took Adams’s
criminal history and the need to deter further criminal conduct
into account but also reasonably reflected the nature,
circumstances, and seriousness of the offense conduct. We
therefore affirm the sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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