UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4046
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TARIK KAWENDO WASHINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (8:05-cr-00399-HMH)
Submitted: June 22, 2006 Decided: June 28, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Barlow Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alan Lance Crick,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Tarik Kawendo Washington pled guilty to felon in
possession of a firearm (count 1), felon in possession of a firearm
with an obliterated serial number (count 2), and possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base (count 3), in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e); 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B) (2000);
and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2000), respectively. The
district court sentenced Washington to 100 months’ imprisonment on
counts 1 and 3, and 60 months’ imprisonment on count 2, all to be
served concurrently, three years of supervised release on each of
counts 1, 2, and 3, to be served concurrently, and ordered payment
of a $300 statutory assessment.* Washington’s counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court complied with the
requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Washington’s plea.
Washington was given an opportunity to file a supplemental pro se
brief, but has failed to do so.
*
The probation officer calculated a sentencing guideline range
applicable to Washington of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment founded
on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of
VI, as a career offender. After careful consideration of the facts
and evidence, the district court determined that one of
Washington’s predicate career offender convictions overstated his
criminal history, and recalculated his offense level to 27 and his
criminal history category to IV, with an attendant adjusted
guideline range of 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment.
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Washington did not move in the district court to withdraw
his guilty plea, therefore his challenge to the adequacy of the
Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). We have carefully
reviewed the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing and find no plain
error in the district court’s acceptance of Washington’s guilty
plea. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir.
1991).
Moreover, we find that the district court properly
consulted the Guidelines and considered them when sentencing
Washington, that it made all the factual findings appropriate for
that determination, considered the sentencing range along with the
other factors described in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2005), and imposed a sentence that was “within the statutorily
prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). The district court properly
sentenced Washington in compliance with the mandates of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Washington’s sentence
was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Washington’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
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further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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