UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5214
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DARRELL ALSTON, a/k/a D,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(CR-05-181)
Submitted: June 14, 2006 Decided: June 27, 2006
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter D. Ward, LAW OFFICE OF PETER D. WARD, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Kwame J.
Manley, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Darrell Alston was convicted by a jury of one count of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one
kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing heroin and
fifty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine
base, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, and two counts of witness tampering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), 1512(b)(3); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a), 846 (2000). Alston was sentenced to life imprisonment,
and he timely appealed. The sole issue Alston asserts on appeal is
a challenge to the manner in which the jury was selected. We
affirm.
Alston, who is African-American, contends the Government
exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory
manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
During jury selection, the Government exercised two of its six
peremptory strikes against African-American venire persons. Alston
raised a Batson challenge, and the district court required the
Government to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.
The Government explained that it had stricken these two individuals
because they were “very young” and noted that it had exercised
strikes against other non-African-American venire persons because
of their young age. Additionally, the Government pointed out that
it had not exercised strikes against older African-American venire
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persons. The district court determined that the Government’s
reason was not pretextual as it was “borne out” by other strikes
the Government had exercised.
Generally, a Batson challenge consists of three steps:
(1) the defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination;
(2) the Government offers a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the
trial court decides whether the defendant has carried his burden
and proved purposeful discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765, 767-68 (1995). “Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie
showing becomes moot.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 395
(1991). Because that is the posture of this appeal, we begin our
analysis with the second step in the Batson inquiry.
The second step requires the Government to proffer a
race-neutral explanation for its strikes. The proffered reason
“need not be worthy of belief or related to the issues to be tried
or to the prospective juror’s ability to provide acceptable jury
service.” Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1995). All
that is required is that the reason be race-neutral. See Purkett,
514 U.S. at 768. The Government’s proffered explanation clearly
satisfies this step.
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For the third step in the inquiry, we review for clear
error the trial court’s finding that the defendant failed to carry
his burden to prove purposeful discrimination. Jones, 57 F.3d at
421. Great deference is given the trial court’s finding as
resolution of the issue rests largely on credibility
determinations. Id. Because age is an acceptable race-neutral
explanation, see United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 834 (4th
Cir. 1998), and Alston has failed to establish that the
Government’s explanation was pretextual, we conclude the district
court did not clearly err in denying Alston’s Batson challenge.
Accordingly, we affirm Alston’s convictions. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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