UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM FRANKLIN SEHEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville. Norman K. Moon, District Judge.
(CR-02-128)
Submitted: June 9, 2006 Decided: July 6, 2006
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Roland M. L. Santos, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellant. John
L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
William Franklin Sehen was sentenced to 121 months’
imprisonment for possession of five grams or more of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841 (2000). We affirmed the conviction, vacated the
sentence, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v.
Sehen, No. 03-4487 (4th Cir. July 14, 2005) (unpublished).
On remand, the district court resentenced Sehen to an
identical term of 121 months’ imprisonment. Sehen again appeals,
contending the district court’s application of a sentencing
enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with
a drug offense, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2002), was clearly erroneous. Furthermore,
Sehen contends the district court did not sufficiently articulate
its consideration of the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
The district court’s enhancement of Sehen’s sentence
under § 2D1.1(b)(1) is reviewed for clear error. United States v.
McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2001). Under the
sentencing guidelines, a defendant receives a two-level increase to
his base offense level under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) if a dangerous
weapon was possessed during the offense. This “adjustment should
be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
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improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) comment. (n.3). The Government need not establish a
perfect connection between the possession of the firearm and the
commission of the drug offense before the enhancement may be made.
See McAllister, 272 F.3d at 234. Evidence of firearms in proximity
to illegal drugs can support a conclusion that the firearms were
possessed during the commission of the drug offense. See United
States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the
enhancement does not “require[] proof of precisely concurrent acts,
for example, gun in hand while in the act of storing drugs, drugs
in hand while in the act of retrieving a gun.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
After carefully reviewing the evidence, we find Sehen has
failed to show that it is “clearly improbable that the weapons were
connected with” his drug offense. See USSG § 2D1.1, comment.
(n.7). Therefore, we conclude the district court’s application of
the sentencing enhancement was not clearly erroneous.
Additionally, we find no merit to Sehen’s contention
concerning the § 3553(a) factors. A “district court need not
explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.” United
States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 632 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted); see United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
2006), petition for cert. filed, Apr. 17, 2006 (No. 05-10474)).
“[A] sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines
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range . . . is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Green,
436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see Johnson, 445 F.3d at 342-44. Based on these
principles, we find the district court adequately considered the
§ 3553(a) factors, and Sehen fails to rebut the presumption that
his sentence, which was imposed at the top of the properly
calculated sentencing guidelines range, was reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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