UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4847
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOHN M. STEVENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (CR-04-217)
Submitted: July 5, 2006 Decided: July 13, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Amy L. Austin,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Research and
Writing Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney,
Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
John Stevens appeals his convictions for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841, possession of
cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 844, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On
appeal, Stevens challenges all of his convictions as violative of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits the
exercise of peremptory strikes “to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race . . . .” Id. at 89. Additionally,
Stevens challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
§ 924(c) conviction. We affirm.
Stevens’ Batson challenge is based upon his argument that the
district court erroneously allowed the government to peremptorily
strike a potential black juror, Juror No. 6, because of her race.
“A finding by the [trial] court concerning whether a peremptory
challenge was exercised for a racially discriminatory reason is
given great deference by this court; we review that finding only
for clear error.” United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 833
(4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original).
The three-step burden-shifting analysis of a Batson challenge
is as follows:
When making a Batson motion, the defendant must first
make a “prima facie” showing of purposeful
discrimination. Once the defendant establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
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prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for
the challenge. If the prosecutor satisfies this
requirement, the burden shifts back to the defendant to
prove that the explanation given is a pretext for
discrimination. The ultimate burden always rests with
the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful
discrimination.
Id. at 833-34 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the
peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate
question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of
whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality
opinion). “At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial
validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason
offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. at 360.
According to counsel for the government, she struck Juror No.
6 because, in her four years as a prosecutor, it had been her
experience “that folks that have sat on juries believe they are
experts and are sometimes not able to discuss issues with others.
[Juror No. 6] indicated she has served on a jury before, a criminal
jury.” (J.A. 55). The burden therefore shifted back to Stevens to
demonstrate that the government’s articulated, race-neutral reason
was a pretext for racial discrimination. United States v. Joe, 928
F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991). Stevens asserted that the
government’s reasoning was pretextual because the government did
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not strike Juror No. 12, a potential white juror who also had
previously served on a criminal jury. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231 (2005) (If “proffered reason for striking a black panelist
applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is
permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful
discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”).
The following exchange between the district court and the
government then took place:
[GOVERNMENT]: But when I saw her response to the
question, I was not comfortable having her on the jury.
THE COURT: The response of [Juror No. 6]?
[GOVERNMENT]: Yes. Yes. I watched as she answered.
THE COURT: What was it?
(J.A. 55).
[GOVERNMENT]: I watched as you asked questions of who
had sat on juries, and things like that, and I looked at
the response on their faces and she kind of smirked. It
may not be a smirk, but it’s something that didn’t leave
me comfortable.
(J.A. 56).
Counsel for Stevens responded: “I don’t think she has given
very solid grounds that she might have given a look, she might not
have given a look.” Id.
The district court considered this argument and concluded:
It’s not whether the grounds are solid. The question is
whether or not she has given a neutral justification for
[her] exercise to strike. I’m going to accept it on its
face, and I do so, and the motion is denied. The record
is preserved.
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Id.
We hold the district court’s finding that the government had
a race-neutral justification for peremptorily striking Juror No. 6
is not clearly erroneous. The district court was in a position to
observe Juror No. 6 as well as the demeanor of government counsel,
and, “[a]s with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the
prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies
peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Hernandez, 500 U.S.
at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, we reject
Stevens’ Batson challenge.
We also reject Stevens’ challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his § 924(c) conviction for possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. A verdict must
be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the government, to support it. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Substantial evidence is defined as
that evidence which “a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, showed that Stevens was the driver of a borrowed
vehicle. While the vehicle was parked on the side of the road with
the engine running, Stevens kept a loaded firearm at his feet in
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the floorboard and held 5.437 grams of cocaine base in his hands,
which cocaine base was packaged for distribution in fifty-four
knotted, clear-plastic baggie corners. From this evidence, the
jury could reasonably infer that Stevens possessed the firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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