UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4546
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO MORENO GONZALES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-329)
Submitted: June 28, 2006 Decided: July 19, 2006
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Sandra J.
Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Antonio Moreno Gonzales on charges of
possession with intent to distribute 5931.9 grams of cocaine
hydrochloride and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) and
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000), respectively. The district court
sentenced Gonzales to a total of 120 months’ imprisonment.
Gonzales now appeals, challenging only the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress evidence seized incident to his arrest.
In denying Gonzales’ motion to suppress, the district
court found that the police officers possessed a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Gonzales was engaged in drug
trafficking. The district court further found that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the officers reasonably approached
Gonzales’ vehicle with their weapons drawn and, after observing
Gonzales make a movement toward his waist consistent with a
“weapons check,” handcuffed Gonzales and placed him on the ground.
Moreover, the district court found that, once Gonzales’ firearm
became visible, the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonzales.
On appeal, Gonzales claims the officers converted the
encounter into a custodial arrest prior to the point at which his
concealed firearm became visible. We review the factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo. See Ornelas v. United
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States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). When a suppression motion has
been denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547
(4th Cir. 1998).
“An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). To conduct a Terry stop, there must be “at
least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Reasonable suspicion requires
more than a hunch but less than probable cause and may be based on
the collective knowledge of officers involved in an investigation.
Id. at 123-24; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232
(1985).
In assessing police conduct in a Terry stop, we look to
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 8 (1989). An officer conducting a lawful Terry stop may
take steps reasonably necessary to protect his personal safety and
to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997); Hensley, 469 U.S.
at 235. Moreover, a brief but complete restriction of liberty is
permitted under Terry. United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108
(4th Cir. 1987). A show of force, including the drawing of weapons
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or handcuffing, does not necessarily connote an arrest. See United
States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Sinclair, 983 F.2d 598, 602 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989).
With these principles in mind, and after a careful review
of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying Gonzales’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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