UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAYSHAWN SHIPMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (CR-05-16)
Submitted: June 30, 2006 Decided: July 18, 2006
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United
States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Rayshawn Shipman of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2000). The district court sentenced Shipman to 360
months’ imprisonment. Shipman’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there were no
meritorious issues for appeal but challenging Shipman’s sentence in
light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In
addition, Shipman has filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm.
The district court sentenced Shipman as a career
offender, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 4B1.1 (2004). Thus, Shipman’s offense level was thirty-seven and
his criminal history category was VI, see id., resulting in a range
of 360 months to life imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines.
See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). His sentence of 360
months’ imprisonment fell at the bottom of this range.
After Booker, a sentencing court is no longer bound by
the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 2309 (2006); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th
Cir. 2005). In determining the sentence, however, courts are still
required to calculate and consider the guidelines range, as well as
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
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2005). We will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable. Hughes, 401 F.3d
at 546-47. Further, “while we believe that the appropriate
circumstances for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range
will depend on the facts of individual cases, we have no reason to
doubt that most sentences will continue to fall within the
applicable guideline range.” United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208,
219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 668 (2005). “[A] sentence
imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range . . . is
presumptively reasonable.” Green, 436 F.3d at 457 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court,
appropriately treating the guidelines as advisory, sentenced
Shipman at the bottom of the applicable range. We conclude Shipman
has failed to rebut the presumption that this sentence was
reasonable.
We have considered the claims raised by Shipman in his
supplemental brief and subsequent filing, and find them without
merit. Contrary to Shipman’s claim, the district court possessed
jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000). Furthermore, the
record reveals substantial evidence supporting the conviction. See
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also United
States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating we do
not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses”); United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
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Cir. 1982) (providing the “government the benefit of all reasonable
inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established”). Similarly, we find meritless Shipman’s conclusory
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, unduly cumulative evidence, and
a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), all of which
stem from Shipman’s unsupported allegations of dishonest testimony
by the Government’s witnesses. We also reject Shipman’s claims of
actual innocence and an alleged abuse of discretion by the district
court with respect to evidence of a photographic lineup identifying
Shipman that was never presented to the jury. Moreover, we find no
Confrontation Clause violation. See Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
Finally, Shipman’s allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel are more appropriately raised in a motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). See United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). We do not find ineffective assistance of
counsel apparent on the face of the record on appeal.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Shipman’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
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court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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