UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5149
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROBERT JOSEPH MCDONALD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (CR-04-92)
Submitted: June 28, 2006 Decided: July 26, 2006
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles M. Henter, DAVIDSON & KITZMANN, Charlottesville, Virginia,
for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Jean B.
Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Robert Joseph McDonald pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute in excess of 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and was sentenced to 235
months in prison. McDonald appeals his sentence. We affirm.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a
sentencing court is no longer bound by the sentencing range
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, which are now advisory.
See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005).
However, in determining a sentence post-Booker, sentencing courts
are required to calculate and consider the applicable guideline
range as well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Id. We will affirm a post-Booker
sentence if it falls within the statutorily prescribed range and is
reasonable. Id. at 546-47. A sentence that falls within the
correctly determined guideline range is presumptively reasonable.
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).*
At sentencing, the district court stated that it had read
McDonald’s Bench Memorandum Regarding Sentencing. The court heard
*
We reject McDonald’s request that we find that this
presumption of reasonableness violates Booker. Similarly, we
reject McDonald’s claim of a Sixth Amendment violation based on a
jury’s not having found facts pertaining to his past criminal
conduct. See United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 640 (2005).
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argument from counsel and stated that it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors. The court sentenced McDonald within the
statutorily prescribed range, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West
1999 & Supp. 2006), and further correctly calculated McDonald’s
guideline range. We therefore conclude that the sentence imposed
is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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