UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1946
OLETA K. GRAHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
JACK B. JOHNSON; PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY FIRE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-04-2391-1-WDQ)
Submitted: July 18, 2006 Decided: July 25, 2006
Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary T. Brown, Peter E. Mina, GARY T. BROWN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. David S. Whitacre, County
Attorney, Rajeshanand Kumar, Associate County Attorney, Tonia Y.
Belton-Gofreed, Associate County Attorney, OFFICE OF LAW FOR PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Oleta Kay Graham, 60, worked for Prince George’s County,
Maryland, for 27 years. She began in 1980 as an administrative
aide in the Office of Emergency Management (“OEM”), a division of
the County Fire Department. She was promoted to Community
Developer at a salary of approximately $68,000. She excelled in
that position, which required her to work closely with other
emergency management groups, and she received outstanding
performance evaluations.
In July 2001, Reginald Parks, an African-American male, became
the director of the OEM. Parks gave Graham, who is Caucasian, the
working title of Deputy Director. Nevertheless, for purposes of
salary, Graham remained classified as a Community Developer.
Although Parks expressed praise for Graham, Parks upset Graham only
a few months into the new job when he called her into his office
and asked her why she laughed at the former OEM director.
In May 2002, Parks was told by his superiors that Graham could
not be reached after the activation of an Emergency Operations
Center (“EOC”), which serves as a command center when a disaster
calls for more than one county to respond. Parks informed Graham
that this was not acceptable and ceased using her as his primary
contact. Parks claims that in February 2003 he was again unable to
reach Graham when an EOC was activated. In response, Parks sent
Graham an email entitled “Disappointed and Frustrated” which
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asserted that Graham had “made it [a] habit of not being reachable
after hours and on weekends” and explained that her tardiness or
failure to appear at “the EOC ha[s] not gone unnoticed by the
administration and volunteers that [she was] supposed to
supervise.” Parks concluded by “questioning [her] dedication to
this office.” Parks allegedly stopped communicating with Graham
following any given reprimand, although he responded to job-related
questions.
Graham expressed to Parks on various occasions her desire to
be promoted. Parks explained that he lacked such authority, as
Deputy Fire Chief Blackwell was the only person able to grant a
promotion within the OEM. However, Parks encouraged Graham to look
for positions in other counties.
In December 2002, Calvin Hawkins transferred from the Office
of the County Executive to the OEM. Hawkins, who was African
American and younger than Graham, was classified as an
administrative specialist but enjoyed the working title of Deputy
Director. Like Graham, however, Hawkins realized no increase in
pay grade with this additional title, and remained at his previous
$80,000 salary. Paula Burr, an African American attorney who was
also younger than Graham, was also transferred to the OEM from the
Office of the State’s Attorney. She was appointed as an
administrative specialist by the County Executive at a salary of
$80,000 to $90,000.
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In March 2003, Public Safety Director Fred Thomas informed
Parks that Graham would be transferred to another office; however,
Thomas was fired shortly thereafter and Parks intended to cancel
the transfer. Graham, however, demanded the completion of the
transfer, which she received on March 17, 2003.
Graham alleges that the County’s actions discriminated against
her on the basis of her sex and race, in violation of Title VII,
and her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”). Specifically, Graham alleges that she was subjected
to a hostile work environment. To advance to trial on this claim,
Graham must adduce evidence that (1) she “experienced unwelcome
harassment”; (2) such harassment was based on her race, sex or age;
(3) “the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of [her] employment and to create an abusive
atmosphere”; and (4) “there is some basis for imposing liability on
the employer.” Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 745-46 (4th Cir.
2006), petition for cert. filed (June 15, 2006) (No. 05-1605). The
district court concluded that Graham failed to forecast sufficient
evidence that the alleged harassment was severe and pervasive.
Graham claims points to the reprimands from Parks regarding her
performance and the harsh way in which Parks communicated (or
refused to communicate). The district court determined that,
although such facts reflected an unpleasant working environment,
they did not support a hostile one based on an unlawful
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characteristic. Additionally, the district court pointed out that
Graham conceded that, despite these instances, she was able to
discuss work-related issues with Parks and continued to perform at
a high level.
Graham also asserts that the County failed to promote her to
the higher Deputy Director pay grade because of her race, age, and
sex. In order to proceed on a failure to promote claim, Graham
must establish that: “(1) she is a member of a protected group, (2)
she applied for the position in question, (3) she was qualified for
that position, and (4) the defendants rejected her application
under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406
F.3d 248, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). Graham does not provide support to
indicate that anyone was promoted to Deputy Director; although
Hawkins and Burr also had a “working title” of Deputy Director,
both employees remained in a separate work classification and
grade. Additionally, even if Graham meets these prima facie
elements, she is entitled only to an inference of discrimination
that can be rebutted if the employer articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The district court
found that the County offered sufficiently legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for not elevating Graham, primarily that
Hawkins and Burr had far more specialized expertise than did Graham
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and were more qualified than Graham. See Evans v. Technologies
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Job
performance and relative employee qualifications are widely
recognized as valid, non-discriminatory bases for any adverse
employment decision.”). Finally, the district court determined
that Graham presented no facts to demonstrate that these reasons
were pretextual.
Graham also alleges the County engaged in wage discrimination
under Title VII. To advance on this claim, Graham must furnish
sufficient facts to permit a trier of fact to conclude that she is
a member of a protected class and the job she was performing was
similar to a higher paying job occupied by persons outside of the
protected class. See Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36
F.3d 336, 343 (4th Cir. 1994). The district court concluded that
Graham failed to adduce facts showing that she was similarly
situated to Hawkins and Burr. All three employees held different
classifications in different pay grades.
We have reviewed the briefs and the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the
reasoning of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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