UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4577
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAVID HARLEY HAYWARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:04-cr-00723-TLW)
Submitted: July 20, 2006 Decided: July 24, 2006
Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Scott Gasser,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Rose
Mary Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
David Harley Hayward appeals his guilty-plea conviction
and thirty-eight month sentence for unlawful possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000).
Hayward’s attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating he finds no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but raising two potential issues. Hayward
declined to filed a pro se supplemental brief. Additionally, the
Government also declined to file a brief. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
In the Anders brief, Hayward contends that the district
court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. by failing to advise him of the
court’s obligation to impose a $100 special assessment and of the
potential for perjury charges should he testify falsely during the
guilty plea proceedings. This Court generally reviews the adequacy
of a guilty plea proceeding de novo. See United States v. Damon,
191 F.3d 561, 564 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). Rule 11 violations,
however, are reviewed under a harmless error standard. See id.
Any variance from the Rule 11 requirements that does not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant is disregarded. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(h); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th
Cir. 1991). Where a defendant fails to move to withdraw his guilty
plea, but instead raises the issue for the first time on appeal, it
is his burden to show: (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) the
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error affected his substantial rights; and (4) the Court should
exercise its discretion to notice the error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 529, 532 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish his
substantial rights were affected, a defendant must demonstrate that
absent the error, he would not have entered his guilty plea. Id.
at 532. This Court may consider the entire record when determining
the effect of any error on Hayward’s substantial rights. See
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 74-75 (2002). After careful
review of the record, we conclude that any error by the district
court did not affect Hayward’s substantial rights. See Martinez,
277 F.3d at 532; United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 465-66
(4th Cir. 1986) (finding that district court’s failure to inform
defendant of its authority to order restitution was harmless error
where court had informed defendant that he faced maximum fine in
excess of restitution eventually ordered); United States v. Graves,
98 F.3d 258, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding harmless error where
there is “no current or prospective prosecution of [defendant] for
perjury” ) (alteration added).
Hayward also contends the sentence imposed by the
district court was unreasonable. After the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 220 (2005), a
sentencing court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the
sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
546 (4th Cir. 2005). However, in determining a sentence post-
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Booker, sentencing courts are still required to calculate and
consider the guideline range prescribed thereby as well as the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). Id. As stated in
Hughes, this Court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is both
reasonable and within the statutorily prescribed range. Id. at
546-47. Hayward’s 38-month sentence was not only within the
advisory guideline range, but also well below the statutory maximum
of ten years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a). Accordingly, we
find the sentence imposed was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Hayward’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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