UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4966
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY MARCELLOUS STEWART,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CR-
04-252-CCB)
Submitted: July 21, 2006 Decided: August 8, 2006
Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Jeffrey E. Risberg, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Gregory Welsh, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Marcellous Stewart entered a conditional guilty
plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). He reserved the right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Following his
conviction, Stewart timely appealed, challenging the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this
court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Jones, 356
F.3d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2004). We review the facts in the light
most favorable to the party that prevailed below. Id.
Police officers discovered the incriminating evidence
after being given consent to enter Stewart’s home by a third party.
The government can justify a warrantless search by showing
permission to search by “a third party who possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs and
conclude that the authority of the third party here was apparent
under the circumstances and the police acted reasonably in relying
on her consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186
(1990); United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866-67 (4th Cir.
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1992). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
Stewart’s motion to suppress.
Therefore, we affirm Stewart’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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