UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4680
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRIAN ERIC COX,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CR-03-154)
Submitted: July 21, 2006 Decided: August 14, 2006
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry M. Anderson, Jr., ANDERSON LAW FIRM, P.A., Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellant. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States
Attorney, Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Brian Eric Cox pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
to knowingly possessing a firearm that had been transported in
interstate commerce after he had been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a) (West 2000). The
plea agreement included a provision in which Cox agreed to be
sentenced in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines. Cox’s base
offense level was twenty-four. The offense level was increased
four levels for using the firearm in connection with another felony
offense. It was increased an additional two levels for obstruction
of justice and decreased three levels for acceptance of
responsibility. At sentencing, Cox did not file any objections to
the presentence investigation report. Because he was in criminal
history category III, his range of imprisonment under the
Sentencing Guidelines was 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. Cox was
sentenced to ninety-eight months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Cox
contends the increase to his offense level for using a firearm in
connection with another felony offense was in violation of the
Sixth Amendment. We vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
Because Cox did not raise an objection below based on the
Sixth Amendment, we review for plain error. United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005). In United States v.
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Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a
Sixth Amendment violation arises where the district court, acting
pursuant to a mandatory application of the Sentencing Reform Act
and the Guidelines, imposes a sentence that is greater than the
maximum authorized by the facts found by the jury or admitted by
the defendant. In United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.
2005), this court found plain error where the defendant’s offense
level was increased based upon judicial fact finding, and under the
mandatory application of the Guidelines the defendant’s sentence
was higher than it would have been had his sentence been based only
on the facts to which he admitted.
We note that an agreement to be sentenced under the
Guidelines does not waive the right to appeal the sentence under
Booker. United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 122-24 (2d Cir.
2005).
Cox’s offense level without the four-level enhancement
would have been twenty-six.1 His sentencing range of imprisonment
would have been seventy-eight to ninety-seven months’
imprisonment.2 Cox’s sentence imposed under a mandatory Guidelines
1
Cox admitted to the enhancement for obstruction of justice and
does not challenge it on appeal.
2
While Cox did receive a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, when determining if Booker error occurred, we look to
the Guideline range based on admitted conduct or facts found by a
jury, and disregard any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
See United States v. Evans, 416 F.3d 298, 300 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005).
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scheme is therefore longer than the sentence the district court
would have imposed without violating the Sixth Amendment.3
Accordingly, while we affirm the conviction, we vacate
the sentence and remand for resentencing.4 Although the Sentencing
Guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes it clear that a
sentencing court still must “consult [the] Guidelines and take them
into account when sentencing.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244-45. On
remand, the district court should first determine the appropriate
sentencing range under the Guidelines, making all factual findings
appropriate for that determination. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The
court should consider this sentencing range, along with the other
factors described in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2005), and then impose a sentence. If that sentence falls outside
the Guideline range, the court should explain the reasons for the
departure as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005). Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must be
“within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”
Id. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3
Cox’s failure to object at sentencing to the findings in the
presentence investigation report does not constitute a Booker
admission, United States v. Milam, 443 F.3d 382, 385-89 (4th Cir.
2006), although district courts may, of course, use undisputed, though
not affirmatively admitted, facts in calculating an advisory
Guidelines range.
4
Just as we noted in Hughes, “[w]e of course offer no criticism
of the district court judge, who followed the law and procedure in
effect at the time” of Cox’s sentencing. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4.
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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