UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4959
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
URIEL DOMINGUEZ-VILLEGAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-05-54)
Submitted: March 27, 2006 Decided: September 18, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian M. Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Uriel Dominguez-Villegas pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); 846 (2000). He
was sentenced to imprisonment for 151 months. On appeal,
Dominguez-Villegas contends that the district court erred in its
application of the sentencing guidelines. We affirm.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound
by the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. See United
States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). However, in
determining a sentence post-Booker, sentencing courts are still
required to calculate and consider the guideline range prescribed
thereby as well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000). Id. As stated in Hughes, this court will affirm a
post-Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and within the
statutorily prescribed range. Id. at 546-47; see also United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating a
sentence imposed within a properly calculated guideline range is
presumptively reasonable). When reviewing the district court’s
application of the Sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews
findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.
Green, 436 F.3d at 456. A sentence is unreasonable if based on an
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error in construing or applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at
456-57.
In calculating the guideline range for each
co-conspirator, “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of
others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense” are to be
included. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2004).
Dominguez-Villegas first argues that the fourteen
kilograms of cocaine seized by law enforcement officers should not
have been attributed to him as there is no evidence that he was
aware of the scope of the conspiracy. This argument, however,
completely disregards the sentencing testimony. Specifically,
Officer Clodfelter testified that items bearing
Dominguez-Villegas’s name, including a suitcase with more than
$26,000 in cash, were discovered in the residence from which the
fourteen kilograms were seized. Some of this cocaine was packaged
in a manner consistent with that recovered from the vehicle driven
by Dominguez-Villegas. Also, airline tickets indicated that he may
have been staying at the residence for more than a week.
Therefore, we conclude the district court properly attributed the
fourteen kilograms of cocaine to Dominguez-Villegas.
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Likewise, Dominguez-Villegas argues that the district
court erred in its application of § 2D1.1(b)(1) as it was not
reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would possess a
firearm.* We have previously determined, however, that “it [is]
fairly inferable that a codefendant’s possession of a dangerous
weapon is foreseeable to a defendant with reason to believe that
their collaborative criminal venture includes an exchange of
controlled substances for a large amount of cash.” United
States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1994) (alteration
in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also United
States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
weapons have become “tools of the trade” in drug trafficking).
Under these facts, we conclude the district court properly applied
the firearm enhancement. Consequently, Dominguez-Villegas’s
sentence, imposed within the properly calculated range, is
reasonable.
*
He does not argue that it is clearly improbable that the
firearm was connected to the drug offense, rather that it was not
reasonably foreseeable to him. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment.
(n.3) (providing for a two-level enhancement when a firearm is
present in a drug offense, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense).
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Accordingly, we affirm Dominguez-Villegas’s sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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