UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANDREW TIMOTHY JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. William L. Osteen,
Senior District Judge. (CR-03-55)
Submitted: September 26, 2006 Decided: September 28, 2006
Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen
C.F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Keith M. Cave, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Timothy Jones appeals from his convictions for
attempted interference with commerce by robbery of SAB Check
Cashing (“SAB”), in violation of the Hobbs Act; armed bank robbery
of First Citizens Bank; and two counts of using a firearm during a
crime of violence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the following elements of his crimes:
(1) SAB was engaged in interstate commerce and (2) First Citizens
was federally insured. Jones also asserts that the court’s jury
instructions allowed the jury to convict him based on actions
directed toward non-employees of SAB Check Cashing. We affirm.
The jury’s verdict must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942). At trial, an independent contractor working at SAB
testified that SAB was engaged in interstate commerce, specifically
check cashing, processing tax work for the Internal Revenue
Service, and utilizing Western Union for business purposes.
Regarding the other robbery, a fifteen-year employee, and former
branch manager, of First Citizens testified that the bank was
federally insured on the date of the robbery. This evidence was
sufficient to prove the elements in question. See United States v.
Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 125-26 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Hobbs
Act should be broadly construed and that jurisdiction prerequisite
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is satisfied by “proof of possibilities,” even if impact on
commerce is small); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 111-12
(4th Cir. 1988) (finding testimony of bank employee sufficient for
jury to conclude bank was federally insured).
Regarding the jury instructions, the district court
explicitly instructed the jury that Jones was charged with
attempted robbery of SAB. In addition, witnesses testified that
Jones attempted to rob SAB by threatening to kill a store employee
and by threatening to shoot a customer. Thus, the evidence
presented to the jury was consistent with both the allegations in
the indictment and the court’s instructions.
We grant Jones’ motion to file a supplemental brief, but
we find the issues raised therein to be meritless. Based on the
foregoing, we affirm Jones’ convictions and sentence. We dispense
with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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