UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
AHKIE RASHARD JENKINS, a/k/a Arkey,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (3:97-cr-00211-REP-6)
Submitted: September 25, 2006 Decided: October 27, 2006
Before TRAXLER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Debra D. Corcoran, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David T.
Maguire, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ahkie Rashard Jenkins appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
eighteen months in prison followed by three years of supervised
release. Jenkins’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in her
opinion, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising
the issue of whether the district court erred in revoking Jenkins’s
supervised release and imposing its sentence. Counsel further
suggests the district court may have been misinformed regarding the
statutory maximum sentence but Jenkins was not prejudiced as a
result. Jenkins has been informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
Upon finding a violation of a condition of supervised
release by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court may
revoke a term of supervised release and require the defendant to
serve in prison all or part of the original supervised release term
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of
supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Based on
Jenkins’s admitted violations, the district court properly revoked
his supervised release and imposed a term of imprisonment. Because
the offense resulting in Jenkins’s original term of supervised
release was a Class A felony, the district court was statutorily
authorized to impose a prison term of up to five years followed by
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a new supervised release term of up to five years less the term of
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h) (2000).* Pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2005), the district
court correctly determined Jenkins’s advisory sentencing range was
six to twelve months.
We will affirm the sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range
and not plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, we
first consider whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable, and if so, whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. While the district court must consider the Chapter 7 policy
statements and statutory requirements and factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (2000), the
court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke the previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
We conclude Jenkins’s sentence was within the statutory
maximum and not plainly unreasonable. The district court
considered the parties’ arguments and stated its reasons for
*
Jenkins pled guilty and was convicted of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 846 (1994), a
Class A felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of ten years to
life and a minimum five-year term of supervised release. Contrary
to counsel’s assertion, the grade of supervised release violation
does not determine the statutory maximum under § 3583(e).
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imposing the sentence. As counsel acknowledges on appeal, an
eighteen-month sentence was not unreasonable in light of Jenkins’s
admitted violations. While the district court noted and considered
the advisory range, the court reasonably determined a sentence
above that range was appropriate based on the abundance of leniency
shown Jenkins in the past and his repeated violations.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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