UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-7507
RONALD EUGENE BOGAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CA-04-2408-18BD)
Submitted: March 29, 2006 Decided: November 1, 2006
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG,* and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tara Dawn Shurling, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Melody Jane
Brown, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
*
Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not
participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Eugene Bogan seeks to appeal the district court’s
orders denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a
habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A
certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district
court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or
wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district
court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000), a one-year
limitation period applies to the filing of § 2254 petitions. Bogan
does not contest that his petition was filed beyond the limitations
period; rather, he argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling.
Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2000).
However, equitable tolling is appropriate only when a petitioner
presents extraordinary circumstances, beyond his control or
external to his own conduct, that prevented him from filing on
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time. Id.; see also Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
Recourse to equitable tolling must be guarded and
infrequent. Harris, 209 F.3d at 330. Consequently, equitable
tolling is appropriate only when the government’s wrongful conduct
prevents a petitioner from filing a timely petition or when
extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make
timely filing impossible. Id. While Bogan’s counsel described the
reason for her error in computing the limitations period, this
court has specifically stated that a calendaring mistake “does not
present the extraordinary circumstance . . . where equity should
step in to give the party the benefit of his erroneous
understanding.” Rouse, 339 F.3d at 248. Accordingly, we conclude
that Bogan is not entitled to equitable tolling.
We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the
appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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