IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________
No. 96-20241
Summary Calendar
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ROBERTO MARINELLI PEREZ, JOAQUINA MARIA SALCEDO P.
DE MARINELLI, Plaintiff-Appellants,
versus
PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants,
SEGUROS PANAMERICANA, S.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-94-3096)
_________________________________________________________________
August 20, 1996
Before DAVIS, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge*:
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the district court's granting of
Defendant-Appellee Seguros Panamericana, S.A.'s ("Seguros") motion
to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) for insufficiency of
process, (b)(4) for insufficiency of service, and (b)(5) for lack
of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.
I.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
On June 6, 1992, Plaintiffs-Appellants, who are residents of
Guatemala, purchased a health insurance policy from Seguros, a
Guatemalan corporation licensed to sell insurance in Guatemala and
a subsidiary of Defendant Pan American Life Insurance Company ("Pan
American"). When Plaintiffs-Appellants' son became ill, they
sought and received medical services from Texas Children's Hospital
in Houston, Texas. After Plaintiffs-Appellants accumulated several
hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical bills, Seguros
terminated their insurance policy and refused to pay their claims.
On September 8, 1994, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit in
district court in Texas against Pan American and Seguros to recover
benefits under the policy issued by Seguros. Pan American filed an
answer subject to a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Seguros did
not enter an appearance in the district court. On January 11,
1995, the court granted both motions and dismissed the suit against
all defendants.
Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed to this Court. On October 20,
1995, we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Pan American
for failure to state a claim for relief. Because Seguros did not
appear in district court, it was not a party of the appeal.
Therefore, we remanded to the district court the remaining claims
against Seguros for further proceedings. On remand, Seguros filed
2
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency
of process, and insufficiency of service. On February 9, 1996, the
district court granted all three motions and entered a final
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims against Seguros.
II.
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that personal jurisdiction
exists because Seguros universally represented that its insurance
policies, including the one issued to Plaintiffs-Appellants,
entitled the holders to medical services at the Houston Medical
Center in Houston, Texas. They argue that Seguros approved their
application to go the Houston Medical Center to procure medical
services for their son, and that by capitalizing on the Houston
Medical Center to the detriment of Texas' hospitals, doctors and
charities, has committed acts that constitute "doing business" in
Texas. Personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo
by an appellate court. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co.,
Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction exists.
Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 867, 113 S.Ct. 193, 121 L.Ed.2d
136 (1992).
A federal court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
to the same extent that a state court in that forum has
jurisdiction. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt,
3
Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20
F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 115 S.Ct. 322,
130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994)). "The reach of a state court's
jurisdiction is delimited by: (1) the state's long-arm statute;
and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution." Id. (citing Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d
213, 215 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Texas long-arm statute,
jurisdiction may be exercised over nonresidents "doing business" in
Texas. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042). The
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant will
not violate due process principles if: (1) the nonresident has
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the
forum state through "minimum contacts" established by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington1; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).
We find no evidence in the record that Seguros has any
contacts with the state of Texas, let alone "minimum contacts" to
allow the federal court to exercise jurisdiction in this case.
Seguros, a Guatemalan corporation, solicits no business in Texas,
does not maintain an office in Texas, and does not have a
representative or agent in Texas. The insurance policy at issue
1
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945).
4
was solicited and issued in Guatemala, and all billing and claims
handling occurred in Guatemala. In fact, the only arguable
"contacts" Seguros has with Texas is the worldwide coverage
language in the policy itself and Plaintiffs-Appellants' claim that
a Seguros representative approved treatment at Texas Children's
Hospital in Houston, Texas. The court's exercise of jurisdiction
based solely on these thin "contacts" would offend the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in granting Seguros motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.2
III.
For the reasons articulate above, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
2
Because we find no personal jurisdiction in this case, we
need not address the remaining issues raised in this appeal.
5