UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1264
JUDY CREECH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (4:04-cv-02484-HMH)
Submitted: December 4, 2006 Decided: January 18, 2007
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Daniel Mayes, MAYES LAW FIRM, Aiken, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Marvin J.
Caughman, Assistant United States Attorney, Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi,
Regional Chief Counsel, Michael A. Thomas, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Judy Creech appeals from the district court’s order
denying her motion for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). For the reasons
stated below, we affirm the district court’s order.
Creech filed an application for supplemental social
security income, alleging disability caused by various medical and
mental health conditions. Her claim was denied. Following a
hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) also denied her
application for benefits.
Creech requested review of the ALJ’s decision and the
Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case
for further proceedings. The order of the Appeals Council
identified two deficiencies in the ALJ’s decision: (1) the ALJ’s
decision failed to properly evaluate mental impairment according to
the applicable regulatory criteria set forth in 20 CFR § 416.920a
(2005), and (2) the ALJ’s decision failed to perform a
function-by-function assessment in analyzing residual functional
capacity.
After a second hearing, the ALJ issued a new decision,
again denying Creech’s application for benefits and concluding that
she is capable of medium, unskilled work. After the Appeals
Council denied Creech’s request for review, she appealed to the
district court. A magistrate judge issued a Report and
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Recommendation recommending reversal of the ALJ’s decision. The
magistrate’s report concluded that the ALJ failed to comply with
the Appeals Council’s order on remand. The magistrate judge also
found that the ALJ’s analysis was inadequate in several respects:
(1) the ALJ failed to evaluate the claimant’s mental impairment in
accordance with the applicable regulations and document its
evaluation as directed in the remand order, (2) the ALJ failed to
provide its rationale with references to the evidence to support
its conclusion regarding the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, and (3) the ALJ failed to properly specify the basis for
its assessment of the claimant’s credibility. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and entered an order
reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding for further
administrative action.*
Creech then filed a motion in district court requesting
approximately $4000 in attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. The
district court concluded that the Commissioner’s litigation
position was substantially justified and denied the motion for
fees. Creech noted a timely appeal.
A claimant is entitled to an award of fees under the EAJA
if: (1) the claimant is a prevailing party; (2) the government’s
position was not substantially justified; (3) no special
*
In her brief on appeal, Creech states that on remand, the ALJ
issued a decision granting her application for benefits without
holding a hearing. That decision is not in the record on appeal.
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circumstances make an award unjust; and (4) the claimant timely
filed his petition supported by an itemized statement. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412. The government's position is “substantially justified” if
there is a “genuine dispute . . . or if reasonable people could
differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.”
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
The government need only be “justified in substance or in
the main--that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person,” id. at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted),
and the government can be substantially justified even if it loses.
Id. at 566 n.2; see also Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991
F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's
denial of attorneys’ fees, even though plaintiffs had prevailed on
two issues, because the government’s overall position was
“substantially justified”). The court must look to the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether the government’s position is
substantially justified. See Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154,
161-62 (1990) (“[T]he EAJA--like other fee-shifting statutes--
favors treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as
atomized line-items.”); Roanoke River Basin, 991 F.2d at 139 (“[W]e
look beyond the issue on which the petitioner prevailed to
determine, from the totality of circumstances, whether the
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government acted reasonably in causing the litigation or in taking
a stance during the litigation.”).
This court reviews the district court’s determination of
whether the government is substantially justified under the EAJA
for an abuse of discretion. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562-63. A
district court abuses its discretion “only if its conclusions are
based on mistaken legal principles or clearly erroneous factual
findings.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 370 (4th Cir. 2001).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find no error
in the district court’s decision. The district court properly
considered the applicable legal standard and did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the Commissioner’s litigation
position was substantially justified. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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