UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5201
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SYLVESTER ARNEZ REDD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CR-
04-417)
Submitted: January 18, 2007 Decided: January 22, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
G. Arthur Robbins, CHESAPEAKE & MERIDIAN, Annapolis, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, John F.
Purcell, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sylvester Arnez Redd, Jr., appeals from his 63-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to distribution of crack
cocaine and his consecutive sentence of 60 months following his
guilty plea to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking offense. Redd’s attorney filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal. Redd was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
The Government argues that the appeal should be dismissed because
Redd validly waived the right to appeal his sentence in the plea
agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver
is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,
169 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the district court fully
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal
during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid
and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 461 (2005); United States v.
Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of
whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a
question of law that we review de novo. Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Redd
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal whatever
- 2 -
sentence was imposed. We therefore dismiss Redd’s appeal from his
sentence.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes our review of the sentence, it does not preclude our
review of any errors in Redd’s convictions that may be revealed by
our review pursuant to Anders. We find that Redd’s guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant
to Rule 11. Redd was properly advised of his rights, the offenses
charged, the mandatory minimum sentence, and maximum sentence for
the offenses. The court also determined that there was an
independent factual basis for the plea and that the plea was not
coerced or influenced by any promises. See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). We affirm Redd’s convictions.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues not
covered by the waiver. We therefore affirm Redd’s convictions and
dismiss his appeal from his sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw from
representation. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel then may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
- 3 -
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
- 4 -