UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1396
MICHAEL COLLIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CHARLOTTESVILLE SCHOOL BOARD; RONALD
HUTCHINSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (3:04-cv-00038-nkm)
Submitted: January 25, 2007 Decided: January 29, 2007
Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert P. Dwoskin, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Richard H. Milnor, ZUNKA, MILNOR, CARTER & INIGO, LTD.,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Collier appeals from the district court's adverse
grant of summary judgment, and dismissal of his employment
discrimination1 and retaliatory discharge action. Our review of
the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this
appeal is without merit. We find, even assuming, arguendo, that
Collier established a prima facie case of retaliation, see
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001),
the district court correctly determined that Collier failed to
rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons the School Board of
the City of Charlottesville and Ronald Hutchinson2 (collectively
the Employer”) proffered to support the decisions to transfer
Collier to a different department and ultimately not to renew
Collier’s job. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973); Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir.
2004). Specifically, the record is replete with evidence of
Collier’s history of poor work habits, attitude, and work ethic
including repeated unauthorized absences from the work site,
failure properly to perform his job, and failure to cooperate with
others, which evidence showed deficiencies that began prior to both
1
Collier does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of
his discrimination claim arising under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a) (2000).
2
At all times pertinent to this case, Hutchinson was the
Superintendent of the School Board.
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Collier’s knee injury and to the Employer’s decision to transfer
Collier, and continued up to the time the Employer decided not to
renew Collier’s job. Neither Collier’s own, unsubstantiated
assertions as to pretext,3 nor evidence of one letter of
commendation from one person, are sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to pretext, or to stave off summary
judgment. See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that employee must present evidence that contradicts the
employer’s proffered discharge motive to prove pretext). Because
Collier failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
the Employer proffered for transferring him and then refusing to
renew his job, we conclude the district court properly granted the
Employer’s motion for summary judgment.
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Employer. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Collier also points to a rebuttal letter he submitted to his
employer relative to a reprimand letter he had received, but
nowhere in that letter did Collier dispute the facts contained in
the reprimand letter, rather, he offered excuses for his improper
actions.
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