UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4238
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CLARENCE DESMOND MOORE, a/k/a Dollar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:05-cr-00768-TLW)
Submitted: February 15, 2007 Decided: February 20, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred
William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clarence Desmond Moore pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine
and five kilograms of more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006). At
sentencing, Moore and the Government agreed that a base offense
level of thirty-six and a total offense level of thirty-three
applied under the Sentencing Guidelines.1 This offense level,
combined with Moore’s criminal history category IV, yielded a
sentencing range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. The
district court sentenced Moore to 192 months of imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel for Moore filed an Anders2 brief, in which he
states there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions
whether the district court complied with the requirement of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Moore’s plea. In a pro se supplemental
brief, Moore asserts that his sentence is improper. We affirm.
Moore did not move in the district court to withdraw his
guilty plea; therefore this court reviews his challenge to the
adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing for plain error. See
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure the
1
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2004).
2
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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defendant understands the nature of the charges against him, the
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences, and other various rights,
so it is clear that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily
entering his plea. The court must also determine whether there is
a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), (3);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
Our review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that the district
court failed to advise Moore that he would be protected against
self-incrimination if he pleaded not guilty and went to trial, and
that the court was required to impose a special assessment as part
of his punishment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(E), (L). We
conclude, however, that these errors did not affect Moore’s
substantial rights, as the district court otherwise conducted a
thorough Rule 11 colloquy that assured Moore’s plea was made both
knowingly and voluntarily.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We have
also considered the arguments asserted in Moore’s pro se
supplemental brief and find them to be without merit. We therefore
affirm Moore’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform Moore, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Moore
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
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for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Moore.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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